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ARTICLES
THE REGULATION OF SPEECH INCIDENT TO THE
SALE OR PROMOTION OF GOODS AND SERVICES:
A MULTIFACTOR APPROACH
Charles Gardner Geyh*
Beginning with the 1975 case of Bigelow v. Virginia,' when the
Supreme Court first intimated that it might afford first amendment
protection to purely commercial speech, the implications of recognizing
a constitutional right to disseminate or receive speech incident to the
sale or promotion of goods and services has attracted more than its
share of scholarly commentary. With a regularity rivalling the annual
effusion of cherry blossoms on the banks of the Potomac River tidal
basin, virtually every Washington spring since the year Bigelow was
decided has brought with it one or more Supreme Court pronounce-
ments on commercial speech, corporate speech, or private business
speech; with each new revelation, cacophonies of commentators have
offered their insights.
The last thing we need, you may therefore be thinking, is another
commentator with insights to offer on the regulation of commercial
speech or other speech incident to the sale or promotion of goods and
services.' The subject is, however, worth another look because, for all
* Counsel to the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property and the Administration of
Justice, United States House of Representatives, Committee on the Judiciary; Professorial Lec-
turer in Law, American University, Washington College of Law; B.A., University of Wisconsin,
1980; J.D., University of Wisconsin Law School, 1983. This Article was developed and written in
my capacity as a member of the adjunct faculty at the American University Washington College
of Law, and does not reflect the views of the House Judiciary Committee or the Subcommittee on
Courts, Intellectual Property and the Administration of Justice. I would like to thank Chris
Eliopulos for his outstanding research assistance, and Steven Reich, Gerry Thain and Emily Van
Tassel, for their helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. Although, for reasons that
escape me, thanking one's editors is not usually done, I would nonetheless like to express my deep
appreciation to the staff of the University of Pittsburgh Law Review-most notably Lisa Giar-
russo, Michael Hino, and Paul Scibetta-for making this a more coherent and readable piece of
work.
1. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
2. In this Article, commercial speech and speech incident to the sale or promotion of goods
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the cases decided and articles written, no one has yet managed to figure
out what is meant by the term "commercial speech," why such speech
should receive less first amendment protection than other kinds of
speech, or why it should receive as little protection as the Supreme
Court has seen fit to give it. Nor has there been a systematic effort to
explain how, if at all, the analysis applicable to commercial speech
should apply to other speech incident to the sale of goods and services.
The problem is that speech incident to the sale or promotion of
goods and services has a protean quality, rendering it difficult to define
or characterize. First, the line separating speech in the commercial
arena from speech in the noncommercial arena is nebulous. Human
speech is sometimes directed toward making the world a better place,
sometimes toward making a buck, and frequently toward a combina-
tion of both. Absent resort to arbitrary distinctions that elevate form
over substance, the difference between speech incident to the sale of
products, which possesses ideological overtones, and speech incident to
the "sale" of ideas, which encourages product sales, is often difficult to
discern. The Court has, however, resorted to such arbitrary distinctions
by creating a special subset of speech incident to the sale of goods and
services, called commercial speech, that is arguably limited to speech
taking the form of commercial advertising or solicitation. 3 The com-
and services are distinct concepts. Commercial speech is used as that phrase has been defined by
the Supreme Court. Speech incident to the sale or promotion of goods and services, on the other
hand, is a broader concept, that includes not only "commercial speech," but corporate speech,
labor speech, what the Court has characterized as private business speech, and any other speech
incident to doing business. No effort is made to give speech incident to the sale or promotion of
goods and services a precise definition, because none is necessary. The concept is used simply as a
reference point for discussion and does not alone serve as a basis for restricting or expanding the
constitutional protection afforded speech.
Some confusion between the two concepts is unavoidable, particularly when the discussion
turns to the possibility of revising the Supreme Court's definition of commercial speech to include
a greater range of speech incident to the sale or promotion of goods and services. I have, however,
done my best to keep such confusion to a minimum.
3. As discussed in greater detail infra at notes 131-60 and accompanying text, the Court
has effectively abandoned efforts to characterize or define commercial speech with reference to the
range of issues addressed by the speech, in favor of an approach that emphasizes form or context
based distinctions, isuch as whether the speech includes a commercial proposition, or whether the
speaker is commercially motivated and the speech is in the form of an advertisement and mentions
a specific product. Board of Trustees v. Fox, 109 S. Ct. 3028, 3031-32 (1989) (Tupperware parties
"propose a commercial transaction" and are therefore commercial speech, notwithstanding that
the parties "also touch upon subjects ... such as how to be financially responsible and how to run
an efficient home"); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983) (pamphlet
addressing the benefits of using condoms as a means to avoid venereal disease was commercial
speech notwithstanding that it discussed important public issues, because it was commercially
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mercial speech subset is simultaneously too large in that it encompasses
noncommercial information dressed up as commercial advertising,4 and
too small in that it fails to encompass related variations of speech inci-
dent to the sale or promotion of goods or services, such as securities
marketing," union picketing,' or corporate image advertising.7
Second, even assuming that one can identify commercial speech in
an appropriate definition, it is difficult to determine the amount of con-
stitutional protection it deserves, and why. Commercial speech is a hy-
brid of commerce and speech. It is related both to the sale of goods and
services and to ideas about those goods and services. As it relates to the
'sale or promotion of goods and services, it occupies the so-called mar-
ketplace of goods and services, where government regulation is re-
garded as presumptively valid.8 On the other hand, as it relates to
motivated, was concededly in the form of an advertisement, and mentioned a specific product).
Moreover, as Professor Shiffrin noted in 1983, the extent to which commercial speech princi-
ples apply outside the context of commercial advertising and solicitation is obfuscated by the fact
that the Court's commercial speech decisions have been limited to cases concerning restrictions
upon conventional advertising and solicitation. Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic
Regulation: Away From a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 1212,
1213 (1983). That statement is equally true today. Over a third of the cases decided have con-
cerned state restrictions upon lawyer advertising or solicitation. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n,
486 U.S. 466 (1988); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985); Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982); Bates v. State
Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). The rest have concerned a variety of advertising or solicitation restric-
tions. Board of Trustees v. Fox, 109 S. Ct. 3028 (1989) (commercial solicitation in state university
dormitories); San Francisco Arts &'Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S.
522 (1987) (trademarks used "to induce the sale of ... goods and services"); Posadas de Puerto
Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986) (casino gambling advertising);
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (prophylactic advertising); Metromedia,
Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (billboard advertising); Central Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (electricity advertising); Friedman v.
Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) (use of trade names in optometry advertising); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v.
Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (house sale advertising); Virginia State Bd. of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (prescription drug advertis-
ing); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975) (abortion advertising); Pittsburgh Press Co. v.
Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (employment classified
advertising).
4. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 579-81
(1980) (Stevens, J., concurring); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 80-84 (Ste-
vens, J., concurring).
5. Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 1230-31; Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Architecture of
the First Amendment, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1181, 1183-84 (1988).
6. Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 1231-32, 1260-61.
7. See generally Note, Corporate Image Advertising and the First Amendment, 61 S. CAL.
L. REV. 459 (1988); Note, Issue Advertising, Commercial Expression and Freedom of Speech: A
Proposed Framework for First Amendment Adjudication, 28 B.CL. REV. 981 (1987).
8. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 729 (1984) ("judgments
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speech and ideological expression, it occupies the marketplace of ideas,
where content-based government regulation has traditionally been re-
garded as inherently suspect.'
In certain respects, commercial speech is thus deserving of full
first amendment protection and strict judicial scrutiny, while in other
respects it is deserving of. no first amendment protection and minimal
judicial scrutiny. The Supreme Court has endeavored to resolve the
problem by splitting the difference, affording commercial speech a
"limited measure" of first amendment protection and an intermediate
level of judicial scrutiny.10 It has done so, however, without providing~a
coherent explanation. Without a clear idea of why commercial speech
should receive a "limited measure" of constitutional protection, it is
difficult to determine whether "limited" should be a lot, or next to
none.
The Court has developed a four part analysis of commercial
speech restrictions that is at least relevant to ascertaining how much
constitutional protection commercial speech receives: a government re-
striction upon (1) truthful commercial speech concerning lawful goods
or services, must (2) directly further (3) a substantial government in-
terest, and (4) be no broader than necessary to accomplish the govern-
ment's objective, if the restriction is to pass muster under the first
about the wisdom of [economic] legislation remain within the exclusive province of the legislative
and executive branches."); City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303 (1976) ("States are
accorded wide latitude in the regulation of their local economies under their police powers ...
[and] the judiciary may not sit as a super-legislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legisla-
tive policy."); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) ("[C]ourts do not substitute their
social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws.");
Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 536 (1949)
("[Sitates have [the] power to legislate against what are found to be injurious practices in their
internal commercial and business affairs, so long as their laws do not run afoul of some specific
constitutional prohibition.").
9. It was Holmes and Brandeis who introduced the concept of the marketplace of ideas to
Supreme Court jurisprudence: "[Tihe ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas-[and] the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the compe-
tition of the market, and . . . truth is the only ground upon which [society's] wishes safely can be
carried out." Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J. joined by Brandeis,
J., dissenting).
Content based restrictions upon speech have long been subject to the strictest of judicial
scrutiny. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972) (government has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content); Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U.S. 263 (1981) (the "most exacting scrutiny" is required in cases where the state undertakes
to regulate speech on the basis of its content).
10. Board of Trustees v. Fox, 109 S. Ct. 3028, 3033 (1989); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
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amendment." Whether, in a given case, the government's interest will
be deemed substantial enough, or the means chosen to further the gov-
ernment interest will be deemed direct and narrow enough, will depend
in large part upon how seriously the Court takes the speech threatened
by the government action at issue. The Court's -four part test is thus
highly malleable and may be applied to afford commercial speech con-
siderable first amendment protection, or virtually none. Any hope for
consistency returns us once again to the need for a fuller appreciation
of how'seriously commercial speech should be taken, i.e., why commer-
'cial speech is deserving of at least some-but only some-protection.
Section I of this Article traces the rise and unjustified decline of
first amendment protection for commercial speech. The reason for the
decline is that the Court has lost sight of the reasons that justify consti-
tutional protection for commercial speech and speech incident to the
sale or promotion of goods and services. Instead, the Court has begun
to rely upon unsupportable reasons for limiting such protection. As a
result, first amendment protection for commercial speech has declined
and is at risk of -being stripped of all constitutional significance.
Whereas reduced judicial scrutiny of commercial speech regulation can
be justified in light of a greater government interest in intervention, it
cannot similarly be-justified on the basis of a diminished constitutional
interest in the speech itself.
In Section II, I discuss the consequences of diminished commercial
speech protection. As commercial speech receives increasingly little
protection, the distinction between minimally protected commercial
speech and fully protected noncommercial speech becomes increasingly
important. The problem, however, is that the distinction the Court has
'made is arbitrary. The result is that form is at risk of controlling sub-
stance: speech in the form of what the Court calls commercial speech is
deemed less important and receives little protection, while speech of
comparable purpose and effect is deemed more important and receives
full protection because it is called noncommercial.
Finally, in Section III, I attempt to provide a more satisfactory
framework for analyzing the regulation of speech incident to the sale or
promotion of goods and services. Such an approach eschews the crea-
tion of artificially distinct lines separating commercial from noncom-
mercial speech. Instead, it advocates a multifactor case-by-case analy-
sis, in which the level of judicial scrutiny afforded the speech depends
11. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
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upon the presence or absence of factors rendering government regula-
tion more or less trustworthy or troublesome. Those factors include (1)
the opportunity for timely expression of alternative viewpoints (the
need for regulation may be greater where the opportunity for airing
competing views is limited); (2) the extent to which truth or falsity can
be objectively verified (regulation of objectively verifiable falsehoods
presents less risk that the government is seeking to restrict access to
truthful speech); (3) the presence of a commercial incentive to exagger-
ate product or service attributes (where such an incentive is present,
the risk of consumer injury and the need for regulation may be
greater); (4) the likelihood of audience manipulation (where speech
threatens to impair the audience's rational decision making processes,
greater regulation may be appropriate); (5) the hardiness of the speech
(where the speaker's financial incentive is such that the threat of regu-
lation will not discourage the speaker from engaging in constitutionally
protected expression, the consequences of regulation are less trouble-
some); and (6) the constitutional implications of compelling additional
speech (where the audience, rather than the speaker, is the one whose
first amendment interests are at issue, regulations compelling addi-
tional speech may pose less of a problem).
Through a case-by-case consideration of these factors, it should be
possible to ascertain whether and how much first amendment scrutiny
is appropriate for any given regulation of speech incident to the sale or
promotion of goods and services-including, but not limited to, com-
mercial speech. Although the analysis should be case-by-case in its ori-
entation, some general observations are possible. Consistent with cur-
rent Supreme Court interpretation, false speech per se is undeserving of
first amendment protection, 12 and the concerns that warrant a privilege
of sorts to disseminate falsehoods outside the commercial sphere do not
apply with equal force to speech within the commercial sphere (Section
III A). The same may be said of deceptive speech, subject to the quali-
fication that the definition of deception has first amendment implica-
tions, to the extent that it encompasses speech that misleads some,
while conveying truthful information to others (Section III B).
The regulation of truthful speech, on the other hand, should not
automatically be subject to less protection simply because it is incident
to the sale or promotion of goods and services (Section III C). Content
based regulations of speech in the commercial sphere, implemented for
12. See infra note 162.
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reasons indistinguishable from those triggering strict scrutiny in the
noncommercial sphere, should not receive a review any less exacting.
There are, however, special justifications for government regulation of
speech incident to the sale or promotion of goods and services. If appli-
cable in a given case, such justifications may render the regulation in-
herently less suspect, and thus deserving of less searching scrutiny.
Those special justifications, which are embodied in several of the six
factors identified above, boil down to this: speech incident to the sale or
promotion of goods and services, in the course of which transactions are
proposed, may present unique opportunities for audience manipulation;
such manipulation, in turn, impairs the audience's ability to rationally
interpret information. In such cases, an assumption underlying the first
amendment-that speech facilitates enlightenment-does not apply to
the same extent; thus, greater regulation is justified. The four part
analysis developed by the Supreme Court, providing limited scrutiny of
commercial speech regulation, is properly applied in this context.
I. THE RISE AND UNJUSTIFIED DECLINE OF FIRST AMENDMENT
PROTECTION FOR COMMERCIAL SPEECH
In the normal course of first amendment analysis, when legislation
regulating words, images or other expression because of their content is
challenged as an abridgment of the freedom of speech, an important
initial question is whether the words, images or other expression are of
a type worthy of first amendment protection. If the answer is "yes",
then the speech will be afforded full first amendment protection and the
regulation will not be allowed to stand unless it is the least restrictive
means available to serve a compelling government interest. This stan-
dard is so rarely met that it is tantamount to restating, for the benefit
of lawyers uncomfortable with plain english, that the regulation will
rarely, if ever, be allowed to stand."3 On the other hand, if the answer
is "no"-which will be the case if the words, images or other expres-
sion can be pigeonholed into one of a limited number of categories,
such as fighting words or obscenity-then the first amendment is inap-
plicable. In such a case, assuming the regulation of fighting words or
obscenity bears a rational relationship to a legitimate government inter-
est, the regulation will invariably survive minimal due process scrutiny,
13. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 789-98 (2d ed. 1988); J. BARRON & C.
DIENES, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICY 722-24 (2d ed. 1982). But see Austin v.
Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 10 S. Ct. 1391 (1990) (upholding state restrictions on
corporate noncommercial speech as "narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest").
1990]
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and be upheld. This standard is as easy to satisfy as the compelling
government interest standard is difficult. 14
In short, when a content-based restriction on words, images or
other expression is challenged on first amendment grounds, the ques-
tion of whether the words, images or other expression constitute pro-
tectable speech is likely to be dispositive of the first amendment claim.
Prior to the 1976 decision of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Council,"' commercial speech presented no
special exception to this proposition. Like obscenity or fighting words,
commercial speech (or at least commercial advertising) was deemed to
fall outside the scope of the first amendment, presumably on the
grounds that it did not implicate first amendment values to a sufficient
degree, and therefore was not speech at all, was worthless speech, or
was speech of such minimal constitutional worth that it should be sub-
ject to any rational government regulation.16
Beginning with Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, commercial
speech was invited to join the first amendment club; unlike other forms
of protectable speech, however, it was not permitted to become a full-
fledged member. While it no longer shared a cell with snuff films,
neither did it rub elbows with the Gettysburg Address. Rather, the
Court's view was that commercial speech was entitled to some constitu-
tional protection, but still remained subject to greater regulation than
other forms of speech.17
For the first time, the Court had created a specific category of
truthful speech eligible for first amendment protection that could be
regulated on the basis of its content without triggering strict judicial
scrutiny. As the Court subsequently elaborated, laws imposing content-
based restrictions upon commercial speech need not be the least restric-
tive means to accomplish a compelling government interest, but need
14. As reflected in the cases quoted in supra note 8, the regulation of business, i.e., nonex-
pressive commercial conduct, is a matter which the courts accord minimal scrutiny. To the extent
a regulation is deemed to reach obscenity only, and not speech, it is simply another form of socio-
economic regulation. As one treatise puts it, in such a case "governmental regulation of obscenity
would be deemed equivalent for constitutional purposes to governmental regulation of nonspeech
activity, such as manufacturing or farming." 1 N. DORSEN, P. BENDER & B. NEUBORNE, EMER-
SON, HABER & DORSEN'S POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES 514 (4th ed.
1976).
15. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
16. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942); Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S.
622 (1951).
17. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771 n.24 ("commonsense differences"
between commercial and noncommercial speech render the former subject to greater regulation).
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only be no broader than necessary to further directly a substantial gov-
ernment interest.18
The extent of the difference between the strict scrutiny applicable
generally to content based restrictions of speech, and the intermediate
scrutiny reserved for commercial speech regulation, is impossible to dis-
cern solely from the language of the two standards. Indeed, apart from
the difference of unquantifiable degree between "compelling," versus
"substantial," and "least restrictive" versus "no broader than neces-
sary," they are quite similar. The critical issue, therefore, is how the
standards are to be construed and applied. To understand the decreased
scrutiny afforded to commercial speech and the lower degree of protec-
tion it receives, it is necessary to understand why commercial speech is
treated differently from other speech. Only then is it possible to assess
how differently commercial speech should be treated.
Given that first amendment jurisprudence is commonly understood
in terms of an accommodation between the competing interests of gov-
ernment and speech,' 9 the inferior position of commercial speech rela-
tive to noncommercial speech can theoretically be justified on the
grounds that the speech interest is weaker, that the government's inter-
est is stronger, or both. As explained below, the first amendment should
tolerate greater government interference with commercial speech than
other kinds of speech on the basis of stronger government interest in
regulation of commercial speech, but not on the basis of a weaker
speech interest. The unjustified decline of commercial speech protection
in the years following Virginia State Board of Pharmacy is due in no
small part to the unsupportable view that commercial speech is of mini-
mal first amendment value relative to other kinds of speech and need
not be taken seriously.
A. Commercial Speech and First Amendment Protection0
There have been numerous attempts by notable scholars to isolate
18. Board of Trustees v. Fox, 109 S. Ct. 3028, 3033-34 (1989); Central Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
19. R. ROTUNDA, J. NOWAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (3d ed.
1986); L. TRIBE, supra note 13, at 789, 792-94.
20. I am going to do my best not to bog this Article down with a protracted discussion of
the purposes served by the first amendment, or by picking an argument with those commentators
and the minority of the Court who contend that commercial speech serves none of those purposes
and should therefore be returned to its rightful place alongside obscenity and fighting words. It is
not that an incisive discussion of first amendment values and a careful defense of commercial
speech against the charge that it deserves no constitutional protection are irrelevant or unimpor-
1990]
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the primary purpose of the first amendment and to delineate its outer
boundaries in light of that purpose. Some have argued that the first
amendment serves to facilitate government decision making and that
speech having an insufficiently close relationship with the political deci-
sion making process is outside the scope of the first amendment.21
Others have contended that the purpose of the first amendment is to
further self-realization, self-expression or self-fulfillment, and that
speech irrelevant to that purpose is equally irrelevant to the first
amendment.22 C)thers have urged that the purpose of the first amend-
ment is to foster a marketplace of ideas, from which truth emerges
victorious after a healthy competition among differing viewpoints.23
Still others regard the first amendment in functional terms, as a device
that promotes social stability by "maintaining the precarious balance
between healthy cleavage and necessary consensus." 24 Finally, it has
tant; it is merely that they have already been undertaken in an extraordinary article by Professor
Steven Shiffrin that I could not hope to improve upon. Shiffrin, supra note 3. Rather than try, I
will simply refer the reader to his essay, and summarize here the reasons for concluding that
commercial speech falls within the ambit of the first amendment.
21. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20
(1971); Jackson & Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Economic Due Process and the First Amend-
ment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1979).
22. Two of the most significant efforts to characterize the values underlying the first amend-
ment as relating to self-realization or self-expression, have been propounded by Professors Baker
and Redish. Professor Baker's approach, summarized infra in notes 41-45 and accompanying text,
has been developed over the course of several articles: Baker, The Process of Change and the
Liberty Theory of the First Amendment, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 293 (1982); Baker, Realizing Self-
Realization: Corporate Political Expenditures and Redish's "The Value of Free Speech", 130 U.
PA. L. REV. 646 (1982); Baker, Press Rights and Government Power to Structure the Press, 34 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 819 (1980); Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA
L. REV. 964 (1978) [hereinafter Baker, Freedom of Speech]; Baker, Commercial Speech: A Prob-
lem in the Theory of Freedom, 62 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1976) [hereinafter Baker, Commercial
Speech]. Professor Redish's approach is described in Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U.
PA. L. REV. 591, 593 (1982). Although Professors Baker and Redish assign comparable names to
their respective theories, their approaches are fundamentally different: whereas Redish views self-
realization as an all encompassing value that subsumes the values advanced by politically based,
marketplace and other approaches, Baker regards self-expression as a limiting concept that oper-
ates to exclude from first amendment protection speech that may be protectable under other theo-
ries. The focus of Professor Shiffrin's concern is upon the intolerance of unified theories toward
first amendment values underlying competing unified theories, and the inability of any one ap-
proach to demonstrate that the values undergirding all the others are wrong. It is therefore Profes-
sor Baker's version of self-realization that exercises Shiffrin and is the focus of his criticism.
23. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See also
J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 17-52 (D. Spitz ed. 1975) (1859) (discussion of the value of diversity of
opinion).
24. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7 (1970). This has been referred
to as the "safety valve" function of the first amendment. M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF
SPEECH § 1.04 (1984).
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been argued that seeking out the purpose or purposes of the first
amendment is a fruitless undertaking, and that freedom of speech
should be viewed as an end in itself.
25
What then of commercial speech, or for the sake of a more con-
crete example, commercial advertising? Advertising may do no more
than tell the audience what is being sold and at what price. But, it may
also educate and inform the public on issues of science, technology,
health, safety, law and government.' It may comment upon social wants
or needs and attempt to influence them; it may communicate conscious
or sub-conscious reflections of popular culture. Often, advertising may
provide the only practicable way for people of limited means to become
aware of where they can buy the "necessities" of life at an affordable
price-a parochial mission perhaps, but one that is, from the perspec-
tive of those struggling to pay the bills, prerequisite to pursuing any of
the loftier objectives of speech.
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the Court implicitly
brought several approaches to bear in justifying the recognition of lim-
ited first amendment protection for commercial speech. First, said the
Court, commercial speech is relevant to government decision making: it
is integral to the success of a free market economy, and as long as the
United States employs a free market economy, understanding its opera-
tion is critical to the making of informed decisions concerning how it
should be regulated.2" As critics have noted, however, it may be that
economic efficiency is facilitated by the exchange of information con-
cerning the wares for sale in the marketplace, but it cannot seriously be
suggested that the promotion of economic efficiency and free enterprise
are values underlying the first amendment.2 It is one thing to say that
speech about the operation of a free market economy is relevant to
informed government decision making, and quite another to say that
speech incidental to the operation of the economy is similarly relevant
(for the same reason that speech about obscenity serves to inform the
electorate, while speech, or at least words, comprising an obscene utter-
ance does not). The better point may be simply that commercial speech
uttered in the context of buying and selling products and services often
touches upon a variety of public issues relevant to political decision
making. As the Court has noted, however, hinging constitutional pro-
25. L. TRIBE, supra note 13, at 785.
26. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumers Council, 425 U.S. 748,
765 (1976).
27. Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 1226-27; Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 21, at 11.
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tection upon the presence or absence of "public" issues serves only to
encourage speakers to add a "public" component to their speech, when
they would not otherwise do so. 28
Second, the Court emphasized that commercial speech is of cen-
tral importance to the economic well-being of both speaker and lis-
tener. Thus, it arguably furthers some kind of self-fulfillment or self-
realization. 9 The fact that commercial speech is important because it
may be integral to the economic survival of both the speaker and the
audience does not of itself mean that it is important for reasons having
anything to do with the first amendment. It is self-fulfillment derived
from expression that is at issue. One approach to the self-expression
theory posits that the self-expressive value to speech is lost if the speech
is not a bona fide expression of self; that is to say, unless speech is
freely chosen by the speaker, it is not legitimate self-expression."0
Under this approach, because commercial speech is essential to the
speaker's economic survival, it is a product of economic necessity rather
than self-expression. It would, therefore, be undeserving of first amend-
ment protection. A contrasting approach to self-expression or self-reali-
zation takes the self-fulfillment of the audience into account and recog-
nizes the value inherent in receiving as well as imparting information. 1
The latter approach would afford constitutional protection to commer-
cial speech because of self-fulfillment the audience derives from receiv-
ing information, but not because of the economic value of the
expression.
Third, concluded the Court, commercial speech makes a relevant
contribution to the pursuit of the truth, or public enlightenment, in a
marketplace of ideas.32 To the extent one subscribes to marketplace
.theory or one of its variations, it is difficult to argue that truthful com-
mercial advertising does not communicate information of public inter-
est that can make a meaningful contribution to the exchange of ideas.33
Assume for the moment that the Supreme Court has tried to prove
too much in suggesting that commercial speech is protectable under all
of these unified theories, and that first amendment protection can be
justified under some theories, but not others. The all-important ques-
28. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562 n.5
(1980).
29. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 756-57.
30. See Baker, Commercial Speech, supra note 22.
31. See Redish, supra note 22.
32. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 769-70.
33. Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 1256-57.
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tion, for purposes of deciding whether the first amendment freedom of
speech should apply to commercial speech thus becomes: which unified
theory is correct? The answer, concludes Professor Shiffrin, is all and
none. All are correct in identifying important purposes served and val-
ues furthered by the first amendment freedom of speech.34 None, on
the other hand, is correct to the extent that particular purposes or val-
ues are extolled to the exclusion of all others. 35
In an effort to demonstrate the inherent inadequacy of unified first
amendment theories predicated upon the proposition that there is. an
exclusive primary purpose or value underlying the freedom of speech,
Professor Shiffrin undertakes a critique of two such theories that would
counsel against affording commercial speech constitutional protection:
the politically based approach, and at least one variation of the self-
realization approach.
1. The Politically Based Approach
Articles by Judge Robert Bork and Professors Jackson and Jeffries
argue that only political speech is protected under the first amendment
freedom of speech.3 This approach postulates that the first amend-
ment's specific reference to the protection of speech requires that the
proper scope of speech be defined by reference to values uniquely re-
lated to speech.3 7 In other words, because speech (and not other con-
duct, activities, or undertakings) is singled out for special mention,
there must be something about speech and speech alone that makes it
deserving of constitutional recognition. To the extent that a value fur-
thered by speech is also furthered by some other activity, that value
neither justifies the special protection afforded speech nor explains why
similar protection is not extended to the other activities that further the
same value. Only political speech, these theorists argue, furthers values
uniquely related to speech, because only political speech has no substi-
tutes for the role it plays in facilitating informed decision making in a
representative democracy. Artistic, cultural, scientific, and commercial
speech may be valued by society, but the same is true of physical exer-
cise, the practice of one's profession, and other forms of nonexpressive
conduct. In other words, the values that adhere to nonpolitical speech
are not uniquely related to speech; they are also advanced by certain
34. Id. at 1251-54.
35. Id.
36. Bork, supra note 21; Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 21.
37. Bork, supra note 21, at 23.
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kinds of conduct. Their protection under the first amendment therefore
necessitates the application of unprincipled value choices by judges.38
Professor Shiffrin's response is two-fold. 39 First, accepting the pre-
mise that political speech alone is deserving of first amendment protec-
tion, commercial speech regularly contains information relevant to the
political process. Commercial speech logically encompasses not only
commercial advertising (which may itself address public issues of im-
portance to the political process), but also speech arising in the context
of labor disputes, securities marketing, and related forums in which is-
sues pertaining directly to the economic future of the nation may be
implicated. These issues clearly fall within all but a pointlessly narrow
definition of political speech.
Second, and perhaps more important, Professor Shiffrin takes issue
with the premises underlying a politically based approach. In Shiffrin's
view, it is nonsensical to deny constitutional protection to nonpolitical
speech for no better reason than that the nature of the judicial role
may make it difficult for judges to apply the values underlying such
speech in a "principled" way. Rather than the first amendment defin-
ing the proper scope of the judicial role, the politically based approach
would have the proper judicial role define the scope of the first amend-
ment. The net effect is that theoretical constructs of the judicial role
achieve primacy in first amendment interpretation at the expense of
both precedent and the concerns of the first amendment's framers.
Moreover, Shiffrin continues, the model of the judicial role favored by
the politically based approach is fatally flawed: there is nothing "un-
principled" about judges making value choices; indeed, value choices
are unavoidable. For that matter, the politically based approach im-
poses its own value choices in concluding that the majority, i.e., the
legislature, should have the right to direct-the fate of all but political
speech, a value choice that favors majoritarianism for its own sake.
It is inadequate to assert that only political speech possesses quali-
ties that are unique to speech and that are not shared by various forms
of activity or conduct. First, there is no reason to conclude that the first
amendment, which protects the "freedom of speech" generally, protects
only that speech furthering values uniquely related to speech. Second,
nonpolitical speech may be regarded as unique, either because it simul-
taneously furthers a range of values in ways that conduct does not, or
38. Id. at 25.
39. The following summary of Professor Shiffrin's critique of the politically based approach
is drawn from Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 1225-39.
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because speech is more susceptible to unwarranted government regula-
tion.40 Third, the values underlying political speech are no more unique
to speech than the values underlying artistic, scientific or other speech.
Various forms of political activity, such as licking envelopes or setting
up chairs at a political convention, can further some of the same values
as political speech.
2. The Self-Expression Approach
One variation of the self-expression approach to freedom of speech
propounded by Professor C. Edwin Baker, places commercial and cor-
porate speech outside the scope of the first amendment.41 Professor
Baker's approach is grounded in a world view that places ultimate pri-
ority on human liberty and the individual's ability to choose her own
way of life. Freedom of speech, in his view, is a vehicle for speakers to
advance their pursuit of liberty through self-expression, provided that
their speech is freely chosen." Commercial and corporate speech,
under this theory, is not freely chosen. Rather, it is dictated by finan-
cial considerations and is therefore undeserving of first amendment
protection."
Baker's argument for excluding corporate and commercial speech
from constitutional protection focuses upon the value of the speech to
the speaker, and takes no account of the first amendment interests of
the listener. This is best explained in light of Baker's criticism of mar-
ketplace theory, which focuses upon the value of speech to the audience
as a means to achieve enlightenment. In Baker's view, the notion that
freedom of speech facilitates competition among ideas in which truth
ultimately prevails is fundamentally flawed: objective truth, according
to Baker, is unknowable. The marketplace theory implicitly concedes
this by premising the need for a free market of ideas upon the notion
that objective truth is unknowable to government.44 In addition, Baker
chafes at marketplace theorists' suggestion that freedom of speech can
properly be compromised by a balancing of interests. Rather, whenever
speech facilitates self-expression and personal liberty, its value is to be
40. Art and music, for example, may fairly be characterized as furthering expressive values
for both author and audience in ways that, say, manufacturing aluminum siding does not, profes-
sionally satisfying though it may be.
41. Baker, Commercial Speech, supra note 22, at 17-18.
42. Id. at 7; Baker, Freedom of Speech, supra note 22, at 974-75.
43. Baker, Commercial Speech, supra note 22, at 17-18.
44. Baker, Freedom of Speech, supra note 22, at 974.
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respected as a matter of principle and is properly regulated only to the
extent that it is coercive, thereby diminishing rather than enhancing
liberty."' Accordingly, the suggestion that commercial and corporate
speech facilitates the listener's ability to pursue truth in the market-
place of ideas does not form a legitimate basis for affording such
speech first amendment protection. Thus, the interest of the audience is
not factored into Baker's analysis.
Shiffrin begins his critique of Baker's approach by arguing that
Baker rests his theory on tenuous empirical foundations. Shiffrin criti-
ques Baker's rejection of first amendment protection for commercial
and corporate speech based upon the premise that the market, not the
speaker, dictates the substance of such speech, and that the speech is
thus not freely chosen."6 Although corporate and commercial speech is
not likely to be antithetical to the speaker's economic interest, the
speech may nonetheless be motivated by, or at least coincident with,
the freely chosen views of the speaker or the speaker's shareholders. At
the same time, if the basis for excluding speech from first amendment
coverage is that the speech is not freely chosen, much of what is now
considered to be noncommercial speech would, by virtue of being moti-
vated by the speaker's concern for her economic well being, fall outside
the scope of the first amendment.
The better starting place, Shiffrin suggests, would be to say that
corporate or commercial speech isnot designed or structured as a vehi-
cle for self-expression. Even accepting, however, that corporate and
commercial speech is not customarily viewed as a vehicle for self-ex-
pression from the speaker's. perspective, -Baker is ultimately unsuccess-
ful in his effort to exclude such speech from first amendment protection
under alternative approaches to the first amendment. Commercial and
corporate speech are of general public interest for reasons touching
upon a variety of first amendment theories, including self-fulfillment
derived from the receipt of information, self-expression facilitated by
the acquisition of information that may then be imparted to others, and
the pursuit of truth.47
As Professor Shiffrin points out, Baker's protestations that the ab-
sence of objective truth renders truthseeking an illegitimate first
amendment objective, ring uniquely hollow in the context of speech on
45. Baker, Commercial Speech, supra note 22, at 44-47.
46. Except as noted, the following summary of Shiffrin's critique of Baker, is drawn from
Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 1245-51.
47. Id. at 1256.
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the order.of: "Wheat Chex stay crunchy in milk." And while one might
respond that this is not the kind of "objective" truth with which the
first amendment is concerned, such an argument implicitly draws an
untenable, content based dichotomy between ideas and facts, with the
former alone eligible for first amendment protection. No credible first
amendment theory, including Baker's, regards this dichotomy as either
practicable or desirable. 8 Shiffrin is equally unsympathetic to Baker's
criticism of balancing methodology, noting that balancing is nothing
more than a process of accommodating competing values, and that ev-
eryone, including Baker, must engage in balancing. Moreover, Baker's
brand of balancing has its own uniquely troubling facets, such as its
sanctioning of defamation, public bestiality, and any other injurious
speech or conduct, provided it is expressive and non-coercive.
Instead of embracing a single, unified theory of the first amend-
ment, which would inevitably be incomplete and inadequate, Professor
Shiffrin has adopted an eclectic approach.49 Such an approach is con-
sistent with the Supreme Court's first amendment jurisprudence, and
rests upon the recognition that there are several philosophical justifica-
tions for the freedom of speech, each of which has some value, though
none of which is without flaw.. Because marketplace theory would offer
commercial speech first amendment protection for reasons Shiffrin
finds persuasive, he spares it the attack levelled at these other two less
tolerant approaches. In rejecting all unified theories, however, Shiffrin
implicitly recognizes that marketplace theory alone is likewise inade-
quate to explain or justify. all relevant application of the first amend-
ment. Apart from the previously discussed question of whether the*
marketplace is capable of ascertaining objective truth, which as Shif-
frin notes is a concern of limited relevance to speech in the commercial
sphere, critics of marketplace theory have correctly identified a number
of market imperfections that impair the market's potential to facilitate
enlightenment. One such flaw, addressed in detail in section III, is the
capacity for audiences to be manipulated by speech for reasons inde-
pendent of the rational, persuasive force of what is said. In Shiffrin's
view, because commercial speech contributes to pursuit of truth in a
marketplace of ideas (and because it contributes to the self-realization
of the listener), commercial speech is properly included within the am-
bit of the first amendment. 50
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1251-56.
50. Id. at 1251-53.
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B. Justifying Diminished Constitutional Protection for Commercial
Speech on the Grounds of a Stronger Government Interest
Accepting tlhat commercial speech is entitled to first amendment
recognition for the foregoing reasons, how much recognition does it de-
serve, and why? In the normal course of first amendment analysis, such
a question would prompt the well settled reply that if it is speech pro-
tected by the first amendment, it is fully protected and may not be
prohibited because of its content, unless prohibition is the least restric-
tive means to accomplish a compelling government interest. 51 Such is
not the case, however, with commercial speech, and for good reason.
But understanding why content-based regulation of commercial speech
need not be subjected to scrutiny as exacting as comparable regulation
of noncommercial speech is essential to assessing the level of scrutiny
that commercial speech regulations are properly due.
The regulation of commercial speech occupies a gray area between
the presumptively invalid regulation of speech, and the presumptively
valid regulation of goods and services. 5 The regulation of speech con-
tent generally gives rise to a suspicion that the purpose or effect of the
government's action is improper or unjustifiable, a suspicion that is al-
most impossible to dispel."3 Conversely, while regulation of commercial
51. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978); Citizens against Rent Control v.
Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Consolidated Edison Co. v.
Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 US. 530 (1980).
52. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 760 (quoting Bigelow v. Virginia, 421
U.S. 809, 826 (1975) ("the 'relationship of speech to the marketplace of products or services does
not make it valueless in the marketplace of ideas' ")). The debate over whether commercial speech
is deserving of any first amendment protection has tended to focus upon whether commercial
speech is more akin to commercial conduct that does not implicate first amendment values, see,
e.g., Bork, supra note 21, at 25; Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 21, at 18, or to speech presenting
information of public interest sufficient to justify constitutional protection, as the Court concluded
in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy.
53. Ordinarily, when the government decides that a speaker may not speak because mem-
bers of the audience may find the speaker's message persuasive and act upon it to their detriment,
the government puts itself in an almost indefensible position. The government must believe either
that it would not be in the public's interest to accept and act upon the speaker's message; or that
it would not be in the government's interest for the public to accept and act upon the speaker's
message, regardless of where the public interest may lie. In the former case, the suppression of
speech is grounded upon the unstated premise that the public cannot be counted upon to weigh
differing viewpoints rationally and to decide for itself what is in its best interest and is better left
in ignorance. In the latter case, naked self-interest motivates the government to silence viewpoints
contrary to its own. In either case, the reasons for regulation are anathema to just about every-
thing for which the first amendment stands.
The assumptions underlying skepticism embodied in the first amendment toward government
regulation of speech content are at least two-fold. One assumption is that more information rather
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speech and other speech incident to the sale or promotion of goods and
services gives rise to the same suspicion, it is a suspicion that is easier
to dispel. First, there is less reason to worry that government regulation
is for the wrong reasons; second, there is less reason to be concerned
about the consequences of government regulation.
1. The Reasons for Government Regulation of Speech Incident to
the Sale of Goods and Services are Less Troublesome and Eas-
ier to Verify54
a. Limited Opportunity for Competing Views
The reason for government regulation of speech incident to the
than less will provide the public with the means necessary to decide what is in its best interest,
that government regulation limiting public access to information undercuts the public's ability to
decide and do what is in its best interest, and that in the absence of regulation, the public stands a
better chance of obtaining the information it needs. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (the framers recognized that "discussion affords ordinarily ade-
quate protection against the dissemination of noxious doctrine" and that the "fitting remedy for
evil counsels is good ones. . . . If there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and
fallacies, to avert the evil by the process of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech,
not enforced silence."); A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 27-28 (1960) ("Just so far as, at
any point, the citizens who are to decide an issue are denied acquaintance with information or
opinion or doubt or disbelief or criticism which is relevant to that issue, just so far the result must
be ill-considered, ill-balanced planning for the public good. It is that mutilation of the thinking
process of the community against which the First Amendment to the Constitution is directed.");
M. NIMMER, supra note 24, § 1.02[G], at 1-42 (1984) ("An implicit corollary of the enlighten-
ment function of freedom of speech is that generally the proper remedy for 'false' or 'bad' speech
lies not in its suppression, but rather in the opportunity to hear more speech, which answers or
corrects the speech which preceded it.").
Second, the government has no monopoly on truth, and so has no legitimate business limiting
access to information as a means to manipulate the public's thinking and protect the public from
itself. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969)
("It is the purpose of the first amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in
which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that market,
whether it be by the government itself or a private licensee."); Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 1256-61;
JS. MILL, ON LIBERTY 18 (D. Spitz ed. 1975) (1859) ("[T]he opinion which it is attempted to
suppress by authority may possibly be true. Those who desire to suppress it, of course deny its
truth; but they are not infallible. They have no authority to decide the question for all mankind,
and exclude every other person from the means of judging.").
54. In the following section, and for that matter throughout this Article, generalizations are
made about the characteristics of speech incident to the sale or promotion of goods and services,
and I am comfortable with the accuracy of those generalizations. On the other hand, the scope of
speech incident to the sale or promotion of goods and services is broad-broader than commercial
advertising and broader than what the court has identified as "commercial speech." Given the
expansive character of such speech, my generalizations will often, if not invariably, have
exceptions.
One sub-species of speech incident to the sale or promotion of goods and services that is not
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sale of goods and services is often the same as for the presumptively
valid regulation of goods and services themselves. The sale of goods and
services is commonly regulated to prevent economic and physical injury
to the public caused by dangerous or defective products and services,
products or services that do not meet consumer expectations, and anti-
competitive product sales practices.55 Speech incident to the sale-of
goods and services can precipitate the same kind of consumer injury.
For example, a soft drink bottle that explodes in the consumer's hands
causes the same injury, whether the bottle explodes spontaneously, or
because the consumer shakes the bottle before opening it, as recom-
mended by the manufacturer in its advertising.
In general, with respect to the regulation of speech, the fact that
the government may properly ban a particular activity, such as the vio-
lent overthrow of government, does not mean that it may properly ban
speech about that activity, notwithstanding that both bans may be mo-
tivated by the same concerns, e.g., keeping the peace and protecting the
public from injury.56 But speech incident to the sale of goods and ser-
vices is different from general speech. One assumption underlying skep-
focussed upon at any length in this piece, but which does not conform to several of the generaliza-
tions I have made, is speech that implements, rather than proposes a commercial transaction. In
such cases-as, for example, the reporting of commercial credit information-the speaker's eco-
nomic motivation enhances rather than hinders the prospects for accurate communication, as com-
pared to speech proposing commercial transactions, where the speaker has a financial incentive to
exaggerate product or service attributes. Similarly, speech implementing commercial transactions
is not necessarily a call to action, and so does not engender the risk of precipitous audience action
that speech proposing transactions may. At the same time, other generalizations such as the hardi-
ness of the speech and the absence of opportunity for opposing views may apply as much or more
so to speech implementing commercial transactions.
In assessing the propriety of restrictions upon the content of speech possessing some but not
all of the characteristics justifying greater government regulation, applicable characteristics
should be taken into account in deciding whether reduced judicial scrutiny is appropriate, while
the inapplicable should be ignored.
55. Without attempting to be exhaustive, it may be noted that the Food and Drug Adminis-
tration guards against the sale of adulterated or misbranded foods and drugs, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301,
331 (1988); United States v. H.B. Gregory Co., 502 F.2d 700 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v.
Articles of Drug, 825 F.2d 1238 (8th Cir. 1987). The Consumer Product Safety Commission has
the authority to ban the sale of dangerous or unsafe products, 15 U.S.C. § 2057 (1988); United
States v. One Hazardous Prod. Consisting of a Refuse Bin, 487 F. Supp. 581 (D.N.J. 1980). The
Federal Trade Commission may order an end to deceptive practices that may cause consumers
physical or economic injury, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (1988); Spiegel, Inc. v. Federal Trade
Comm'n, 540 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1976); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Food Town Stores, Inc., 539
F.2d 1339 (4th Cir. 1976).
56. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (invalidating criminal syndicalism stat-
ute, on the grounds that the advocacy barred by the statute was not properly limited to that likely
to incite or produce imminent lawless action).
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ticism toward government regulation of speech is that the public is ca-
pable of deciding what is in its best interest. Another is that freedom of
speech will, in the absence of regulation, encourage robust debate gen-
erating information sufficient to permit the public to make the right
choice, e.g., to eschew violent overthrow of government as a poor
idea."7 The nature of speech incident to the sale of goods and services is
such, however, that there is often little opportunity or incentive for the
airing of more than one point of view before the listener reaches a deci-
sion and takes action.58
Commercial advertising, for example,. is by its nature a call to ac-
tion.59 Often it will contain specific time parameters within which the
listener must act. To the extent that an advertiser provides listeners
with inaccurate, misleading or incomplete information, the capacity of
the. "marketplace" to generate alternative or supplemental views is
greatly circumscribed. The listener is being explicitly or implicitly en-
couraged to respond promptly to the advertiser's call to action, and
may do so before an -alternative view can be presented. 0 Moreover, the
57. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
58. Commercial speakers have every incentive to emphasize the good things about their
products while ignoring the bad, which is no less true of noncommercial speakers who are seeking
to "sell" their ideas. Unlike the noncommercial sphere, however, where as previously noted, it is
ordinarily assumed that incomplete or wrongheaded speech will ultimately be corrected by more
speech, see supra note 53 and accompanying text, an almost contrary assumption pervades the
regulation of speech in the commercial arena. Thus, for example, the Federal Trade Commission
has long prohibited half truths or material omissions as deceptive. P. Lorillard Co. v. Federal
Trade Comm'n, 186 F.2d 52, 58 (4th Cir. 1950) ("To tell less than the whole truth is a well
known' method of deception; and he who d6ceives by resorting to such method cannot excuse the
deception by relying upon the truthfulness'per se of the partial truth by which it has been accom-
plished."); Katherine Gibbs School, Inc. Y. Federal Trade Comm'n, 612 F.2d 658 (2d Cir. 1979)
(failure to disclose material information may cause an advertisement to be deceptive even though
it does not make false statements as such); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 741
F.2d 1146 (9th Cir. 1984); Simeon Management Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 579 F.2d 1137
(9th Cir. 1978). A half truth is capable of deceiving, however, only to the extent that the listener
is not exposed to. the other half of the truth. Implicitly then, the Federal Trade Commission's
regulation of such speech proceeds under the assumption that listeners will not have sufficient
access to alternative viewpoints to allow for the truth to emerge before action is taken.
59. "When I write an advertisement, I don't want you to tell me that you find it 'creative.; I
want you to find it so interesting that you buy the product. When Aeschines spoke, they said,
'How well he speaks.' But when Demosthenes spoke, they said, 'Let us march against Philip.'" D.
OGILVY, OGILVY ON ADVERTISING 7 (1985).
60. Indeed, the listener may be prompted to act before the government has an opportunity
to intercede and silence the speech, let alone prepare and disseminate a competing viewpoint. For
that reason, the Federal Trade Commission, for example, is empowered to obtain preliminary
injunctions in federal court, pending administrative actions for cease and desist orders. 15 U.S.C.
§ 53(b) (1988); see Federal Trade Comm'n v. Food Town Stores, Inc., 539 F.2d 1339 (4th Cir.
1976).
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advertiser has unparalleled access to information about the product be-
ing advertised, information that other potential speakers do not possess
and can obtain only at considerable expense. When the expense is cou-
pled with the downside risk to competitors of "casting the first stone"
in a counter advertising campaign, there is often insufficient incentive
to present an alternative view." l
When speech favoring the violent overthrow of government crosses
the line between advocacy and incitement, when it is on the verge of
instigating a riot, and when no opportunity for reflection or further ex-
change of views is possible before action is taken, the Court has long
held that the "clear and present danger" justifies government action in
halting the speech.6 2 Advertising likewise may incite consumers to take
action resulting in injury before an exchange of views can occur. Con-
cededly, there is a distinction to be drawn between rioters and shoppers
(except, perhaps, on the day after Thanksgiving). The public threat
posed by a charismatic with a bullhorn working a crowd into a froth is
different in degree and kind than that posed by a television spot
presenting a one-sided view of why consumers should buy shorts at
Sears. In the latter case, potential injury is obviously less imminent and
less extreme; nevertheless, the same concern over the inadequate oppor-
tunity for an exchange of views that justifies government intervention
in cases of clear and present danger should justify intervention in ad-
vertising, albeit to a lesser extent.
b. Objectively Verifiable Reasons for Government Intervention
Speech incident to the sale or promotion of goods and services is
often persuasive speech calculated to convince listeners that they should
61. In an excellent article published in 1978, Professor Robert Pitofsky discussed the disin-
centives for advertisers to challenge each other's advertising campaigns in court. Pitofsky, Beyond
Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation of Advertising, 90 HARV. L. REv. 661 (1978).
Since that time, advertisers have begun to sue each other in exponentially increasing numbers,
notwithstanding the disincentives that Professor Pitofsky identifies. Nevertheless, there are addi-
tional disincentives to challenging a competitor's advertising in the mass media that do not apply
to doing so in court, among them being the risk of appearing unduly negative to consumers, and
reinforcing name recognition of the competitor's brand by using it in counteradvertising.
62. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., joined by Holmes, J.,
concurring) ("[N]o danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless the inci-
dence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall before there is opportunity for full
discussion."). The clear and present danger rationale may be seen as a categorical or definitional
balancing of interests in which quelling speech is the least restrictive means to accomplish the
government's compelling interest in avoiding a riot.
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buy a particular good or service. 3 A consumer may take any of a vari-
ety of factors into account in deciding what products or services to buy,
including, but not limited to price, quality, convenience, personal pref-
erence, and "value added" considerations. The common bond among
these factors is that they relate to the intrinsic or comparative benefits
attributable to a product or service. Speech seeking to persuade listen-
ers to buy given products or services can thus be expected to focus upon
product or service characteristics: "Buy brand X cereal, because it is
priced at $2.95 a box; because it is high in fiber and eating it as part of
a high fiber diet may help reduce your risk of cancer; because it comes
in handy individual serving size packets; and because it tastes good."
As the foregoing example illustrates, statements concerning prod-
uct or service characteristics are more often than not objectively verifi-
able: either the cereal is priced at $2.95 and is sold in individual serv-
ing packets, or it is not. The indisputable truth can be readily
ascertained. Consequently, the Court has identified the objectively veri-
fiable character of commercial speech as one of the "common-sense dif-
ferences" separating it from noncommercial speech.64
Commentators critical of the Court's "common-sense" distinction
argue that commercial speech is not always objectively verifiable. 5 In
the cereal ad hypothetical, for example, whether dietary fiber assists in
cancer prevention remains open to scientific debate and is not currently
subject to "verification." Moreover, whether a cereal tastes "good" is a
matter of subjective preference immune to objective measurement. But
that misses the point. We are dealing in "common-sense" general im-
pressions here, not mathematical axioms, and the fact that less than all
speech in the commercial arena may be subject to objective verification
does not refute the accuracy of the generalization, or eviscerate the
utility of the distinction to the extent it applies.
The government has an important interest in preventing and re-
ducing the risk of physical and economic injury to the public. False,
63. Nonpersuasive speech implementing commercial transactions by means of communica-
tions intrabusiness, interbusiness, or between business and consumers will likewise ordinarily in-
volve the transmission of objectively verifiable information. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (upholding defamation liability for dissemination
of false commercial credit information).
64. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
771 n.24 (1976).
65. Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U.L. REV. 372,
385-86 (1979) (criticizing'the view that commercial speech is more easily verified than political
speech); Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 1218.
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deceptive, misleading and manipulative statements about products or
services may precipitate physical and economic injury to consumers; as
suggested in the preceding section, the marketplace cannot always be
counted upon to counter such statements and provide consumers with
the timely information they need to avoid injury.6" A lingering concern,
however, is that the government may be attacking particular state-
ments for the purpose of imposing its own perverse views of truth on
the public, rather than preventing physical or economic injury.
That concern is partially dispelled to the extent that the state-
ments the government challenges are objectively verifiable. If, for ex-
ample, the government challenges a statement as untrue and likely to
cause injury because it is untrue, it is easier to take the government at
its word when the falsity of the statement under attack can be indepen-
dently ascertained. Speech incident to the sale of goods or services
tends by its nature to focus upon product or service characteristics.
Statements about product or service characteristics tend to be objec-
tively verifiable in nature. When the government seeks to silence state-
ments that are not objective ("Cereal X tastes good" may be an exam-
ple), suspicion concerning the government's motives is not allayed. 7 On
66. See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
67. Traditionally, representations actionable as unfair, deceptive or defamatory have been
limited to representations of fact. Statements of opinion have been exempted from exposure to
liability for common law misrepresentation, deception under the Federal Trade Commission Act,
or false representations under the Lanham Trademark Act. Presidio Enters., Inc. v. Warner Bros.
Distrib. Corp., 784 F.2d 674, 678-83 (5th Cir. 1986) (puffery is not actionable-under common law
or state Deceptive Trade Practices Act); Carlay Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 153 F.2d 493 (7th
Cir. 1946) (puffery is not actionable under the Federal Trade Commission Act); 15 U.S.C.
§ 57(a)(1) (1988) (limiting actionable representations in advertising or promotion under the Lan-
ham Act to misrepresentations of fact); Data Cash Sys., Inc. v. JS & A Group, Inc., 223 U.S.P.Q.
865 (N.D. II1. 1984) (defendant's advertisement of computer chess program as "new" and "like
playing Karpov" is puffing and not actionable under the Lanham Act).
The two-fold explanation for exempting statements of opinion or puffing from regulatory ac-
tion has been that such claims are "not capable of objective measurement," and that no reasona-
ble consumer would believe them. Pitofsky, Federal Consumer Legislation, 28 Bus. LAw. 289, 294
(1973). To these may be added a third, offered by Judge Goldberg in the above cited Presidio
Enterprises case:
Opinions and beliefs reside in an inner sphere of human personality and subjectivity that
lies beyond the reach of the law and is not subject to its sanctions. . . . [A]ctions for fraud
or misrepresentation must be based on objective statements of fact, not expressions of per-
sonal opinion. The law wisely declines to tread in the latter area because, in some deep
sense, "everyone is entitled to his own opinion."
784 F.2d at 679.
The point worth emphasizing is simply that the government has tended not to take action
against the expression of opinion in the commercial arena, for reasons -independent of, though not
entirely unrelated to, concerns underlying the first amendment. One notable exception, where
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the other hand, when the government challenges the veracity of an ob-
jective statement concerning a product or service characteristic, and
when that characteristic is rendered difficult to prove true or false be-
cause available evidence is incomplete or contradictory ("Cereal X is
high in fiber and may reduce 'your risk of cancer"), the nature of the
claim may still partially alleviate concerns over government motives. If
there is an objectively verifiable basis for the government's position that
the claim is false, and if it is clear that the public, due to an insufficient
opportunity for corrective counter-speech, may suffer physical or eco-
nomic injury if the government's position is correct, then there is less
cause- for concern that the government objective is to suppress truth
rather than to prevent otherwise unavoidable public injury.",
opinion is actionable, has been in cases where the speaker may be imputed to have special knowl-
edge by virtue of education, training or position. Where, for example, a physician renders a medi-
cal opinion, the physician's training and experience are such that it is reasonable for a patient to
rely on the physician's judgment; moreover, there is an objective basis.upon which to evaluate the
reasonableness of the physician's opinion, thus infusing the opinion with the objectively verifiable
quality lacking in most puffery. Presidio Enterprises, 784 F.2d at 679-80. See also Hedin v. Min-
neapolis Medical & Surgical Inst., 62 Minn. 146, 64 N.W. 158, 159 (1895) (medical opinion is
actionable in deceit).
68. Thus, for example, the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") has proposed to limit
the scope of permissible health claims that may be made for food products. The line FDA has
drawn falls far short of permitting any claim that is not demonstrably false. Rather, FDA's cur-
rent proposal is to create a safe harbor for an extremely limited group of well substantiated
claims, and to put manufacturers on notice that claims outside the safe harbor "will be at signifi-
cant risk of regulatory action by FDA." Draft Public Health Message Final Rule at 14 (August
31, 1988) (This draft has been informally circulated but has not been formally published in the
Federal Register. The FDA's notice of proposed rulemaking was published in 52 Fed. Reg. 28843
(1985) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101) (proposed August 4, 1987). A copy of the draft final
rule is on file with the University of Pittsburgh Law Review).
FDA's draft final rule may survive first amendment scrutiny under either of two approaches.
First, consumers may assume that manufacturers would not tout the health benefits of their prod-
ucts on food labels unless their claims were substantiated by a quantum of evidence comparable to
that required by FDA. To the extent that manufacturers make claims based on less substantiation
than consumers have reason to expect, the claim is misleading, notwithstanding that the claim
may ultimately prove to be true. See Federal Trade Commission, Policy Statement Regarding
Advertising Substantiation, 49 Fed. Reg. 31000 (August 2, 1984) (advertiser's failure to possess
prior substantiation constituting a reasonable basis for objective product claims is an unfair and
deceptive trade practice; advertising stating or implying that the advertiser possesses a particular
level of substantiation for a product claim, must be supported by the stated or implied level of
substantiation).
Second, one may view the draft final rule as a restriction on potentially deceptive speech,
which unlike deceptive speech is deserving of constitutional protection. Friedman v. Rogers, 440
U.S. 1, 13 (1979); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978). FDA's insistence upon
an elevated level of substantiation has an objectively verifiable basis-namely, the scientific uncer-
tainty surrounding the validity of most health claims. Accordingly, even though the truth or fal-
sity of given health claims may be open to question, FDA's objective in restricting health claims is
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c. Commercial Motivation of the Speaker
The importance of the speaker's commercial motivation as a factor
justifying greater government regulation of commercial speech is easy
to overstate. It is, nevertheless, a relevant consideration contributing to
the ultimate conclusion that commercial speech may properly be regu-
lated mote closely than noncommercial speech.
It has been correctly observed that all kinds of speech can be com-
mercially motivated.69 But for the fact that it helped pay the rent, the
world might never have been blessed with Shakespeare's Hamlet, John
Rawls' A Theory of Justice or Spinal Tap's Lick My Love Pump (as
with most blessings, this one too is mixed). In these cases, however, the
speaker's commercial motivation does not threaten to skew the speech
in such a way as to cause the kind of injury that the legislature may
have a legitimate interest in preventing. Shakespeare, Rawls, and Spi-
nal Tap may have had a financial incentive to present their speech in
such a way as to maximize their profits, but it is impossible to say how
that motivation may have affected the content of their speech and
what, if any, public injury could have resulted.70
to prevent the potential for injury from false claims, rather than to impose its own controversial
definition of the truth.
69. Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 474 (1966) (citing New York Times v. Sulli-
van, 376 U.S. 254, 265-66 (1964)); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959) (principle that
"commercial activity, in itself, is no justification for narrowing the protection of expression se-
cured by the first amendment" precludes considering book writer's commercial motive for fear of
inducing self-censorship).
70. It would be facile to say that the influence of the profit motive on speech as product is
altogether unpredictable. A socialist newspaper sold primarily to a socialist audience has a finan-
cial incentive to advocate socialist ideas. The relevant point, however, is that it is neither possible
nor appropriate to assess the extent to which the ideas espoused by the newspaper are born of
political ideology or economic necessity.
In this regard, it is useful to compare Perma-maid Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 121 F.2d
282 (6th Cir. 1941), and Scientific Mfg. Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 124 F.2d 640 (3rd Cir.
1941). In the former case, a manufacturer of stainless steel cookware was ordered to cease and
desist from disseminating pamphlets that made false representations as to the supposed harms
associated with aluminum cookware, and the court of appeals affirmed. In Scientific Manufactur-
ing, on the other hand, the author of the pamphlets disseminated by Perma-maid was likewise
ordered to cease and desist, but the court of appeals set the order aside. The author had a com-
mercial interest in selling the pamphlet to the public (including Perma-maid), but no commercial
interest in selling cookware. The court was of the view that the Federal Trade Commission Act
authorized the FTC to order false or deceptive speech to cease and desist only to the extent that
such speech was made by one in the affected trade, and that a contrary interpretation would run
afoul of the first amendment.
By virtue of being in the relevant trade, Perma-maid had an economic incentive to exaggerate
the virtues of its products and the pitfalls of its competitors' products; and utilizing Scientific
Manufacturing Company's pamphlets was one means to do so. Scientific Manufacturing, in con-
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With speech incident to the sale or promotion of goods and ser-
vices, however, we are not concerned with speech as the product or
service being sold, but with speech as a vehicle for encouraging or im-
plementing the sale of some other product or service (recognizing that
the product or service being sold may include speech, as in the case of a
legal opinion letter). Here, the commercial motivation will incline the
speaker to skew the content of speech in a particular direction-toward
putting the product or service in its best light. The problem, of course,
is that if the product's best light is not bright enough to sell the prod-
uct, the speaker has an incentive to resort to false, misleading or ma-
nipulative speech, which can result in economic or physical injury that
the legislature has every right to prevent.
Financial gain is only one of several motivations that may cause a
speaker to distort the truth-jealousy, spite, and political ambition are
others. Unlike other motivations, however, financial gain is fairly pre-
dictable in certain contexts. It is safe to presume that a speaker who
profits from the sale of a product she exhorts the public to buy is moti-
vated at least in part by financial gain; in contrast, while one may al-
ways harbor suspicions, it is difficult to make comparable presumptions
when speech is motivated by jealousy, spite or political ambition.
The relevance of the speaker's economic motivation should not be
overstated. It may be that economic self-interest can safely be pre-
sumed to encourage exaggerated and therefore misleading representa-
tions in the context of speech incident to proposing commercial transac-
tions, while comparable presumptions concerning the impact of other
motivations on other kinds of speech cannot ordinarily be made. But
that is not always the case. One could surely argue, for example, that a
candidate's political self-interest just as predictably encourages exag-
gerated and misleading political speech. Even so, however, that would
not justify as much government interference with political speech as
with commercial speech. As discussed elsewhere in this section, there
trast, was not in the business of selling cookware. To be sure, it had a financial interest in selling
pamphlets, and to the extent one of its major clients-Perma-maid-would only buy those pam-
phlets if they contained inflammatory remarks about aluminum cookware, Scientific Manufactur-
ing had a financial incentive to make such remarks. Nevertheless, the point remains that the
motivations underlying the sale of speech as product are more complicated and unpredictable than
the motivations underlying the sale of products generally. It is safe to assume that the speech of a
pot and pan seller, such as Perma-maid, on the subject of the pots and pans it is offering for sale,
will be influenced by its interest in selling pans. It is impossible to assess the extent to which
Scientific Manufacturing was operating out of an interest in alerting an unsuspecting world to the
dangers of aluminum, and to what extent it was simply pandering to its buyers.
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are a variety of' reasons for regulating commercial speech more closely
than noncommercial speech that have nothing to do with the speakers'
underlying motivations.
In short, the speaker's economic self-interest is simply one of sev-
eral factors that, taken collectively, jus tify increased government regu-
lation of speech. incident to the sale of goods and services. Greater reg-
ulation is properly tolerated when the speaker has a commercial
incentive to present an exaggerated or one-sided view of product or ser-
vice characteristics; when listener acceptance of that view may result in
economic or physical injury; when there is insufficient opportunity for
listeners to be provided with the information needed to avoid physical
or economic injury; and when the government regulates such speech for
the purpose of protecting listeners from physical or economic injury.
Government intervention is not justified, however, for purposes of re-
stricting public access to information so the government may impose its
own biased views of what is true or best for the public.
d. Opportunity for Manipulation of the Audience
Speech incident to the sale or promotion of goods and services is
ordinarily calculated to elicit the patronage of listeners, at least to the
extent that the speech is uttered in connection with proposing, rather
than implementing, commercial transactions. In such cases, the listener
is being encouraged, directly or indirectly, to part with her prop-
erty-usually money-in exchange for a product or service. The prod-
uct or service at issue represents an immediate and tangible benefit of
the exchange. In contrast, the benefits associated with "buying" what
noncommercial speech is "selling"-e.g., a political viewpoint-tends
to be more remote and intangible. The immediate and tangible benefits
of acting upon an invitation to engage in a commercial transaction or-
dinarily relate to the satisfaction of physical, financial or psychological
needs of the purchaser. 71 Such appeals to nonrational human needs
71. It is useful to distinguish the nonrational needs satisfied by commercial transactions
from the speech encouraging purchase of goods or services that satisfy those needs, which may
make a perfectly rational appeal: e.g., "I will sell you your life saving medication at the lowest
price in town." It may also be noted that the generalization pertaining to the nonrational charac-
ter of the needs satisfied by the sale or promotion of goods or services must admit to exceptions.
The most obvious is where the product or service for sale is itself protectible speech, such as a
book or a motion picture. In such cases, where the benefit of the proposed transaction relates to
the buyer's interest in ideas, the risk of interference with the buyer's rational decision making
process may be less. It may be noted in passing that the Court has recognized the special problems
associated with restricting speech incident to the sale of other speech. See supra note 69.
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have historically created unique opportunities for manipulation of the
consumer's decision making process. It is precisely because of this
problem that the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") has historically
protected gullible as well as "reasonable" consumers from deception. In
addition, the FTC has the authority to restrain trade practices deemed
"unfair," notwithstanding that they may not be false or deceptive.72
2. The Consequences of Government Regulation of Speech Inci-
dent to the Sale or Promotion of Goods and Services are Less
Troublesome
a. The Consequences of Regulation Generally-the Hardiness of
Speech Incident to the Sale or Promotion of Goods and Services
The relative hardiness of commercial speech is among the "com-
monsense differences" between commercial and noncommercial speech
identified by the Supreme Court in Virginia State Board of Phar-
macy.7" As the Court explained, the speaker's financial incentive to ex-
ploit the commercial speech right to its fullest, reduces the risk that
fear of regulation will discourage or chill the exercise of constitution-
ally protected speech.74
Commentators have criticized the Court on this point, correctly
noting that while fear of regulation may not cause a commercially mo-
tivated speaker to be silent, it may nonetheless influence the content of
what is said..75 Thus, for example, a risk averse advertiser may choose
to make unassailable claims that are devoid of content, rather than fac-
tual claims that, while legitimate, could provoke a government inquiry
resulting in adverse publicity and an expensive lawsuit.
The Court's point that government intervention poses less of a
threat to the viability of commercial speech nevertheless remains a
sound generalization. Government regulation of products and services,
and speech incident to the sale of goods and services, are long accepted
facts of business life, thus rendering the brooding omnipresence of po-
tential government intervention less threatening and more routine to
speakers in the commercial arena than elsewhere. 76 Moreover, a com-
72. See S. OPPENHEIM, G. WESTON, P. MAGGS & R. SCHECHTER, UNFAIR TRADE PRAC-
TICES AND CONSUMER PROTECTION 539-45 (4th ed. 1983).
73. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
771 n.24 (1976).
74. Id.
75. Redish, supra note 22, at 633; Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 1218.
76. In Handler, The Self-Regulatory System-An Advertiser's Viewpoint, 37 FOOD DRUG
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mercial speaker has a financial incentive to resist unjustified govern-
ment interference with the dissemination of messages that the speaker
has determined are likeliest to persuade its listeners. Before a commer-
cial speaker can be expected to abandon an optimally persuasive (and
therefore optimally lucrative) communications campaign, the costs of
doing so must outweigh the benefits; the added benefit of financial gain
associated with the speech ensures that the costs must be correspond-
ingly higher before the speech will be abandoned.
In short, commercial speakers are less likely to be fazed by gov-
ernment peering over their shoulders than are noncommercial speakers.
This is not to dispute that the threat of government intervention will
discourage some commercial speakers from engaging in constitutionally
protected speech. The essential point remains, however, that as com-
pared to the normal run of noncommercial speakers, commercial speak-
ers have an extra incentive to stick to their guns. For that reason, the
chilling effect of government regulation upon constitutionally protected
commercial speech is likely to be less extreme.
b. The Consequences of Regulations Compelling Additional
Speech--Affirmative Disclosure Orders
Compelling a speaker to say what she does not want to say in-
fringes upon the satisfaction the speaker derives from self-expression to
no less an extent than compelling her not to say what she wants to
say.77 The satisfaction the speaker derives from speaking her mind on
matters of politics, the arts, science, or the economy, is as circum-
scribed by required insertions to, as deletions from, her speech.
When it comes to speech incident to the sale or promotion of goods
and services, however, the speaker's first amendment interests are at-
tenuated. As to corporate speech, it is illogical and ill-advised to con-
clude that artificial entities are capable of self-fulfillment or self-ex-
pression deserving of first amendment protection. This is not to say that
corporate speech is undeserving of constitutional protection. Rather, it
is simply to say that self-expression, self-realization or self-fulfillment
are attributes of speech that only natural persons are capable of en-
CosM. L.J. 257 (19:32), for example, an in-house counsel for Lever Brothers, Inc. discusses the
broad range of advertising regulations that her company accepts and encourages.
77. Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (government may not compel a show of re-
spect for the flag); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (government may not compel drivers
to display state motto "Live free or die" on their license plates).
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joying, and that the constitutional value of corporate speech cannot be
derived from its value to the speaker.7
Natural persons, on the other hand, are a different matter. Human
psychology is tricky business, and While it may be safe to assert that
the profit motive can be expected to influence speech in particular
ways, 79 it is another thing, altogether to assert, as Baker does, that such
speech is financially dictated, cannot be freely chosen, and is thus inca-
pable of being a means of self-expression.
The better point may be Shiffrin's-that regardless of whether
speech incident to the sale of goods and services is capable of further-
ing the speaker's self-expression, it is not ordinarily so utilized.80
Rather, it is primarily a vehicle for proposing and implementing com-
mercial transactions. To the extent that speech in the commercial
arena is a vehicle for self-expression, the government interests previ-
ously identified (the limited opportunity for additional views, the objec-
tively verifiable reasons for government intervention), coupled with the
countervailing interest of marketplace theory in maximizing the dis-
semination of truthful information, justify compelling commercial
speakers to say more than they otherwise would.
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the Supreme Court has
concurred in the view that the audience is the focus of concern in the
commercial and corporate speech context."' As the Court has noted,
78. Corporate employees may well derive vicarious self-fulfillment from the speech they
draft for the corporation, as may shareholders who invest in such corporations. The corporation as
a concept, however, is premised upon the fiction that it is a separate, artificial "person" indepen-
dent of the people who own and operate it. As an independent, artificial person, the corporation is
separately taxed and separately liable for its debts, which is precisely why the corporate form is
attractive to officers, directors and shareholders. Given 'that the natural persons who own and
operate the corporation voluntarily separate themselves from the artificial person they create in
order to reap financial rewards, there is no sound reason to disregard that separation for purposes
of first amendment analysis, by saying that the self-fulfillment that corporate employees or share-
holders derive from corporate speech should be attributed to the corporation.
79. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
Speakers who are natural persons present a tougher question. Although it may not be impos-
sible for natural persons to derive self-fulfillment from uttering speech incident to transacting
business, the satisfaction thereby derived is inextricably intertwined with the satisfaction associ-
ated with transacting the business itself, which has nothing to do with speech. Given Professor
Shiffrin's intuitively sound observation that speech in the commercial and corporate context is not
ordinarily employed as a means of self-expression, the generalization that speakers do not further
self-fulfillment through commercial and corporate speech is a reasonable one.
80. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
81. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the Court defended the decision to extend consti-
tutional protection to commercial speech, at least in part upon the premise that commercial adver-
tising is important to the viability of the business. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia
1990]
32 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH. LAW REVIEW
"the extension of First Amendment protection to commercial speech is
justified principally by the value to consumers of the information such
speech provides."82 Similarly, the Court has justified the extension of
full first amendment protection to corporate noncommercial speech
with the explanation that "the inherent worth of the speech in terms of
its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity
of its source.""3
Accordingly, in evaluating the constitutionality of regulating
speech incident to the sale or promotion of goods and services, the focus
shifts to the impact of the regulation upon the listener. Compelling a
speaker to provide more information in the form of affirmative disclo-
sures will not ordinarily affect the listener's interest in the speech ad-
versely, and may, for that matter, facilitate it. 84 For that reason, com-
pelling additional speech does not pose the same constitutional
problems as restricting speech in the commercial arena.
C. Reduced Protection for Commercial Speech Cannot be Justified
on the Basis of a Weaker Speech Interest
For a variety of reasons, government interference with speech inci-
dent to the sale or promotion of goods and services is easier to square
with t'he first amendment than is a comparable level of interference
with other kinds of speech. Those reasons have to do with the greater
government interest in regulation, and the less troublesome conse-
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976). It is unclear what the relevance of this
observation is for purposes of first amendment analysis. A host of factors may be essential to the
financial health of the business enterprise: effective advertising, a favorable economic climate,
comprehensive liability insurance, competent management, etc. The fact that liability insurance is
important to the success of a business, however, does not mean that it is important for reasons
having anything to do with speech, or that a business has a first amendment right to liability
insurance. Similarly, the importance of advertising to the speaker does not mean that the speaker
has a first amendment interest in advertising.
82. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985).
83. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 533 (1980) (quoting
First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978)) (emphasis added).
84. One exception may be where affirmative disclosure orders are so onerous as to discour-
age the speaker from speaking at all, if speaking means that the speaker must make an affirmative
disclosure order it cannot abide. In such a case,. the first amendment implications of the order
should logically be examined more closely. See, e.g., National Comm'n on Egg Nutrition v. Fed-
eral Trade Comm'n, 570 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978) (revising
FTC affirmative disclosure order in trade association advertising discussing the relationship be-




quences of such regulation. They have nothing to do with a weaker first
amendment interest.
In Virginia State -Board of Pharmacy, the Court suggested that
commercial speech has as much first amendment significance as other
kinds of speech. As the Court put it, for the listener, the interest in
information conveyed in prescription drug advertising "may be as keen,
if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political
debate." '85 Two commercial speech decisions later, however, the Court
backpedalled. Commercial speech was subject to greater regulation
than other kinds of speech, not only because of "commonsense differ-
ences" rendering government regulation of commercial speech less
troublesome, but also because commercial'speech was less important.8"
The Court has not attempted to explain why it deems commercial
speech to be of subordinate constitutional value relative 'to other kinds
of speech. One possible explanation is that it regards commercial
speech as implicating values less central to the purposes 'served by the
first, amendment. While commercial speech may generate information
of general interest that contributes to self-realization and the collective
pursuit of truth, it has comparatively little to do with the "core" values
of facilitating self-governmentand political decision making. The obvi-
ous problem with this explanation is twofold: first, the Court has not
limited constitutional protection for artistic, scientific and other speech
that implicates self-government values indirectly, if at all;87 second, as
previously discussed, there is no adequate basis upon which to conclude
that self-government is the primary purpose served by the first
amendment.88
Alternatively, the Court may view commercial speech as implicat-
ing values central to the first amendment, but to a lesser extent than
other kinds of speech. Such a view has at least superficial appeal: while
Plato's Republic and an advertisement for Farberware pots both make
85. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
763 (1975).
86. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) ("[clommercial speech [is
afforded] a limited measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale
of First Amendment values"), reh'g denied, 439 U.S. 883 (1978).
87. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 395 U.S. 367 (.1969)
(first amendment applies to expression of social, political, esthetic, moral and other ideas); Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952) ("The importance of motion pictures as an
organ of public opinion is not lessened by the fact that they are designed to entertain as well as
inform.").
88. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
1990]
34 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW
some contribution to the pursuit of truth and self-realization, intui-
tively, the contribution of the Farberware ad would seem to be more
modest.8 9
Translating this intuition into a rule of constitutional law that
deems commercial speech to be less important and therefore less pro-
tected than other speech, however, is highly problematic. If intuition
justifies ranking commercial speech behind other forms of protected
speech, there is no reason to stop there; indeed, a host of rankings are
possible. The New York Times is more important than People maga-
zine; the film Citizen Kane is of greater constitutional value than Mars
Needs Women; speeches of political candidates on the campaign trail
are more important than the exhortations of bag ladies from public
park podia, and so on. To the extent one embraces the devaluation of
commercial speech on the basis of a collective hunch, there can be no
objection to a program of prioritizing all kinds of speech on similar
grounds.
If one accedes to the judgment that commercial speech is intui-
tively less valuable and thus less protected than noncommercial speech,
it follows that it should be possible to make other intuitional value
comparisons not only between different types of noncommercial speech,
as suggested above, but also between different types of. commercial
speech; indeed, this is what the Supreme Court appears to have done.
Abortion advertising is deemed more important than other advertising
as it concerns information on the availability of a service with constitu-
tional dimensions. 90 Gambling advertising (where gambling is legal) is
less valuable than other advertising, because gambling is customarily
illegal.91 Trade names are less valuable than other commercial speech
89. Shiffrin, supra note 3, at 1257-58 ("[M]any commentators have a rather strong intui-
tion that the pharmacist drug advertising is far afield from genuine first amendment values ....
The combination of a particular profit motive and of subject matter triggers the intuition.").
90. In Posada; de Puerto Rico Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 345
(1986), the Court distinguished a ban on gambling advertising, there at issue, from a ban on
abortion advertising held unconstitutional in Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), on the
grounds that the subject matter of the latter ban was constitutionally protected.
91. In Posadas, the fact that casino gambling was prohibited in most states appears to have
prompted the Court to stop short of conceding, as it had with respect to lawyer advertising, pre-
scription drug advertising, and public utility advertising in earlier cases, that the underlying activ-
ity being advertised was clearly lawful, and not misleading or fraudulent, therefore.entitling the
advertising to some constitutional protection. Rather, the Court went only so far as to say that




because of the nature of information communicated by a trade name.91
In balancing the government's interest in regulation against the
audience's first amendment interest in access to information, Central
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission provides a
means for ascertaining the relative strength of the government's inter-
est in the commercial speech context.9" It does not provide a means for
ascertaining the relative strength of the first amendment interest, which
is fine, provided that the first amendment interest remains constant. If,
however, the first amendment interest is variable, the Central Hudson
analytical framework is frustrated because the question of whether the
Government's objective is sufficiently substantial and the means to
achieve that objective are sufficiently direct and narrow will depend en-
tirely upon the relative value of the speech against which the govern-
ment's interest is balanced. To the extent intuition, rather than an ar-
ticulable standard, controls the assessment of the relative first
amendment value of commercial speech in any given case, the Central
Hudson analysis becomes highly manipulable. As a result, "important"
commercial speech is scrutinized more closely and receives greater.pro-
tection than commercial speech, deemed trivial, irrespective of the out-
come suggested by a straight forward application of Central Hudson.
Posadas de Puerto Rico Association v. Tourism Company of Pu-
erto Rico94 illustrates the problems associated with affording commer-
cial speech diminished protection on the basis of its lesser constitutional
value. Posadas concerned a legislative and administrative prohibition
on advertising directed toward Puerto Ricans for legal casino gambling
in Puerto Rico. The justification offered for the prohibition was to re-
duce the demand for casino gambling, thereby reducing both the inci-
92. Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 12, 15-16 (1979) ("A trade name is, however, a signifi-
cantly different form of commercial speech . . . [because it] has no intrinsic meaning . . . [and]
conveys no information about the price and nature of the services offered. . . . [Restricting the
use of tradenames thus] has only the most incidental effect on the content of commercial
speech.").
93. Recall that steps two through four of the Central Hudson analysis-which are the steps
applicable to commercial speech deserving of constitutional protection-relate exclusively to the
nature and extent of the government's interest in regulation and not to the nature or strength of
the speaker or listener's interest in the speech: step two-is the government's interest in the speech
substantial; step three-does the regulation directly advance the governmental interest asserted;
step four-is the government regulation more extensive than necessary to accomplish its purpose.
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
94. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
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dence of casino gambling and, ultimately, the harm it causes among
Puerto Ricans. 5
The dissenters and a number of commentators have argued that a
straight forward application of the Central Hudson analysis should
have rendered -the Posadas advertising ban invalid.96 First, did the ban
apply to truthful advertising about a lawful activity? Yes.97 Second, did
the government have a substantial interest in the ban? No. If the gov-
ernment had a bona fide interest in protecting the public from harms
associated with gambling, it would have banned all gambling advertis-
ing, not just casino gambling advertising. The ban's failure to encom-
pass advertising for state sponsored gambling gives rise to the suspicion
that the government's interest had more to do with protecting state
sponsored gambling from competition than with protecting the public
from the harms associated with gambling. 8 Third, did the ban directly
further the government's interest? No. Restricting the advertising of
only one of several forms of gambling, so as to reduce the demand for
gambling, as a means to reduce the incidence of gambling, ultimately
in order to reduce the harms associated with gambling, is indirect at
best.99 Fourth, was the ban no broader than necessary to accomplish
the government's objectives? No. Less.drastic alternatives would have
included state sponsored counter speech, or vigorous enforcement of
laws prohibiting many of the harmful activities associated with garfi-
bling, such as extortion, racketeering, prostitution, etc.1"'
The fact that the Posadas. majority found these arguments unper-
suasive is less important than why it found them so. Regardless of
whether the outcome in Posadas can be justified on the basis of a
forthright application of Central Hudson, the significance of Posadas is
that its application of the four part Central Hudson analysis was less
than forthright. As discussed earlier, Central Hudson provides a means
to evaluate whether the government's objective in regulating commer-
cial speech is substantial enough, and whether the means it has chosen
to accomplish that objective are direct and narrow enough to justify the
burden the regulation imposes on first amendment values. It does not
95. Id. at 341.
96. Id. at 348 (Brennan, J., dissenting); L. TRIBE, supra note 13, at 901-904; Kurland,
Posadas de Puerto Rico v. Tourism Company: "'twas strange, 'twas passing strange, 'twas pitiful,
'twas wondrous pitiful", 1986 SuP. CT. REV. 1.
97. 478 U.S. at 352 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 352-55:
99. Id. at 355-56.
100. Id. at 356-58.
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provide a means to assess the first amendment value of commercial
speech on a case-by-case basis. Therefore, a meaningful application of
Central Hudson depends upon the presumption that the constitutional
value of commercial speech remains constant. Implicitly, however, the
Posadas Court gutted commercial speech of all, or nearly all, value, so
that any rational government regulation would employ a means suffi-
ciently direct and narrow to accomplish an objective sufficiently sub-
stantial to withstand first amendment (or more accurately, minimal- due
process) scrutiny.
The Court began by reiterating the observation first made several
commercial speech opinions earlier, that commercial speech "receives a
limited form of constitutional protection." 10 1 Moreover, the Court ap-
peared to suggest that the protection afforded speech for gambling ser-
vices may be even more limited. As previous opinions had made clear,
step one of the Central Hudson test required that commercial speech
relate to a lawful activity to be deserving of any constitutional protec-
tion. 102 While casino gambling Was perfectly legal in Puerto Rico, it
was traditionally illegal in most places, prompting the Court to con-
clude that casino gambling pertained to a lawful activity, and was
therefore entitled to constitutional protection only "in the abstract."10
With regard to whether the government had a substantial interest
in the ban under step two, the Court determined, solely on the basis of
the assertions in the brief submitted on behalf of Puerto Rico, that the
legislature's objective was to reduce the harmful effects of casino gam-
bling on Puerto Ricans.' Examining whether the advertising ban di-
rectly advanced the legislature's objective under step three, the Court
concluded that the legislature "obviously believed" that casino gam-
bling advertising would increase the demand for casino gambling, that
such a belief was a "reasonable one," and that the third prong of the
Central Hudson test was satisfied when the legislative judgment was
not "manifestly unreasonable."1 '
101. 478 U.S. at 340.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 340-41.
104. Id. at 341. In addition to representations in the brief, the Court referred to a letter
from Posadas to the Tourism Company, acknowledging that the legislature wanted "tourists to
flock to the casinos to gamble, but not our own people." Id. That letter, however, did not address
the issue that troubled the dissenters. That is, why the legislature wanted to discourage casino
gambling among Puerto Rico residents, leaving unaddressed the question of whether Puerto Rico
was simply trying to protect state sponsored gambling from competition.
105. Id. at 341-42. The Court opined that although the ban was underinclusive as to gam-
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Finally, the Court concluded that it was "clear beyond peradven-
ture"'1 6 that the advertising ban was no broader than necessary to ac-
complish the legislature's objective under step four.1"7 The ban did not
apply to all casino gambling advertising, but was tailored to prohibit
only advertising directed toward residents of Puerto Rico. In response
to the contention that the ban was broader than necessary, given the
less restrictive alternative of disseminating counterspeech warning the
public as to the harms of casino gambling, the Court declared that "it
is up to the legislature to decide whether or not such a 'counterspeech'
policy would be as effective" as a ban."0 8 "The legislature could con-
clude, as it apparently did here," said the Court, that such a policy
would not be effective. 10 9
In short, the Court's review of Puerto Rico's advertising restric-
tions bears all the earmarks of minimal due process scrutiny. Puerto
Rico's legislative objective was substantial, accepting at face value
counsel for Puerto Rico's characterization of that legislative objective.
The ban directly advanced the legislative objective, as it was not a
"manifestly unreasonable" means to the desired end. Finally, the ban
was no broader than necessary because the legislature "could con-
clude" that alternatives would be ineffective.
The heightened scrutiny customarily afforded first amendment re-
strictions was entirely lacking; at bottom, the Court ascribed no true
first amendment significance to the speech at issue. The Court reasoned
that because the legislature possessed the "greater" power to ban gam-
bling, it necessarily possessed the "lesser" power to ban gambling ad-
vertising." 0 The "greater" power to ban gambling, however, is nothing
more or less than the legislative power to pass socioeconomic legisla-
tion, which ordinarily possesses no first amendment implications and
will be upheld if rationally related to a legitimate legislative objective.
If product or service advertising may be restricted whenever the prod-
bling generally, it did not result in a less direct means to reduce the demand for the casino gam-
bling affected by the ban. Because casino gambling had been legal for a shorter time than other
forms of gambling not addressed by the ban, the Court was satisfied that the decision to ban
casino gambling advertising was premised upon the view that the risks of casino gambling were
greater than the risks posed by traditional forms of Puerto Rican gambling.
106. For the benefit of readers unacquainted with the subtle nuances of the law, this phrase
should usually be accompanied by an asterisk and the helpful explanation that the author is only
kidding, particularly when the phrase is called into service in a five to four decision.
107. 478 U.S. at 343.
108. Id. at 344.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 34:5-46.
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uct or service may be restricted, it effectively reduces the level of scru-
tiny afforded commercial speech to that afforded socioeconomic
legislation.
The Court's analysis makes sense only if speech about the product
or service has no first amendment value independent of the product or
service itself. For example, the "greater" power to prohibit a Commu-
nist uprising does not subsume the "lesser" power to ban the Commu-
nist Manifesto, because the Communist Manifesto has independent
first amendment value entitled to independent constitutional protection
in the form of heightened judicial scrutiny. In a Supreme Court case
decided in the wake of Posadas, the state of Colorado was prompted to
argue that the greater power to prohibit the state initiative process al-
together included the lesser power to restrict expression relating to the
initiative process. A unanimous Supreme Court rejected the argument
with the explanation that the Posadas rationale applies only to restric-
tions upon commercial speech."l '
Confining the Court's analysis to commercial speech, however,
does not help matters. To the extent commercial speech has any inde-
pendent first amendment value, legislative restrictions upon it should be
scrutinized more closely than legislative restrictions upon the goods or
services to which the commercial speech relates. Indeed, prior to
Posadas, the best, if not the only articulation of the argument that the
greater power to ban goods and services should include the lesser power
to ban advertising for those goods and services, was in a law review
article by Professors Jackson and Jeffries. There, the authors proffered
this argument as the basis for concluding that commercial speech has
no first amendment significance and is therefore not entitled to consti-
tutional protection. 12
Posadas is undeniably responsible for causing a respectable chunk
of the commercial speech firmament to break loose and land with a
loud, dull thud. It would nonetheless be premature to suppose that the
entire sky is falling. In Board of Trustees v. Fox,"3 the Court sought
to clarify the quantum of protection commercial speech should be af-
forded. In that case, a State University of New York ("SUNY") reso-
lution barring commercial enterprises from operating on SUNY facili-
11. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988).
112. Jackson & Jeffries, supra note 21, at 34. It may be added that the Jackson & Jeffries
article was cited in the majority opinion in Posadas, albeit on a separate point. 478 U.S. at 340
n.7.
113. 109 S. Ct. 3028 (1989).
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ties was applied by campus police to prohibit a company from
demonstrating and selling its wares at a party hosted in a student
dormitory." 4
The district court upheld the resolution against a constitutional
challenge initiated by students and the company.11 5 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed and remanded, on the
grounds that it was unclear whether the third and fourth prongs of the
Central Hudson test had been satisfied." 6 The court of appeals in-
structed the district court to make additional findings, and to conclude
that the fourth prong was satisfied only if the resolution constituted the
"least restrictive measure" to accomplish the state's objective." 7
The Supreme Court agreed that the case should be remanded for
further findings, by the district court, but disagreed with the circuit
court's characterization of Central Hudson as disallowing commercial
speech restrictions that fall short of being the least restrictive means to
further the government's ends. 118 As the Court correctly noted, subject-
ing commercial speech regulations to a least restrictive means analy-
sis-a standard traditionally reserved for fully protected speech-
would be inconsistent with the Court's well established view that com-
mercial speech is not fully protected." 9
At the same time, however, the Court reaffirmed that commercial
speech was deserving of some constitutional protection, and likened the
quantum of protection due commercial speech to that afforded expres-
sive conduct, or time, place and manner restrictions imposed upon fully
protected speech.120 What that means, opined the Court, is that a regu-
lation will survive constitutional scrutiny even if it is not the least re-
strictive means to accomplish the government's ends: "We have not in-
sisted that there be no conceivable alternative but only that the
regulation not 'burden substantially more, speech than is necessary to
further the government's legitimate interest'.... And we have been
114. Id. at 3030-31.
115. Fox v. Board of Trustees, 649 F. Supp. 1393 (N.D.N.Y. 1986).
116. Fox v. Board of Trustees, 841 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1988).
117. Id.
118. 109 S. Ct. at 3032-35.
119. Id. at 30.33 ("Our jurisprudence has emphasized that commercial speech . . . is sub-
ject to 'modes of regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of noncommercial expres-
sion' . . . . The ample scope of regulatory authority suggested by such statements would be illu-





loath to second guess the government's judgment to that effect." '
What is required, continued the Court, is a "fit" between government
ends and means "that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that
represents not the single best disposition but one whose scope is 'in pro-
portion to the interest served.' "22
The Court rejected the suggestion that its approach was "overly
permissive," adding that it was "far different" from a rational basis
standard of review. The Court further stated that with commercial
speech "we require the government goal to be substantial, and the cost
to be carefully calculated." '23 "By declining to impose, in addition, a
least-restrictive means requirement," concluded the Court, "we take
account of the difficulty of establishing with precision the point at
which restrictions become more extensive than their objective requires,
and provide the legislative and executive branches needed leeway in a
field (commercial speech) 'traditionally subject to government
regulation.' "124
At first blush, Board of Trustees offers some useful elaboration
upon the magic words in the Central Hudson test. In the end, however,
the opinion may simply have added a few new magic words to the lexi-
con. In deciding whether a regulation is "more restrictive than neces-
sary" within the meaning of Central Hudson's fourth prong, one must
decide whether the regulation "burden(s) substantially more speech
than is necessary to further the government's legitimate interest," or
alternatively, whether its "scope is in proportion to the interests
served."
Whether these new formulations of the fourth prong are satisfied
in any given case will continue to depend upon how seriously the Court
takes the speech being regulated. When, as in Virginia State Board of
Pharmacy and several of the lawyer advertising cases, a majority of the
Court takes the speech under regulation seriously, a determination
whether the scope of the regulation is in proportion to the interests
served will follow a careful review of the justifications offered for the
regulation, and a close look at alternative forms of regulation.1 25 On
121. Id. at 3034 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 109 S. Ct. 2746, 2758 (1989)).
122. Id. at 3035.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. While the protection afforded commercial speech has been more or less consistently
qualified and diminished by the string of cases decided after Virginia State Board of Pharmacy,
the lawyer advertising decisions represent something of an exception. The Court has struck down
all or part of lawyer advertising restrictions in five of the six cases decided since Virginia State
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the other hand, where, as in Posadas or Friedman v. Rogers, a major-
ity of the Court regards the speech at issue as essentially trivial, the
same determinations will follow an all but complete capitulation to the
legislature's judgment.126 Given the Court's admonition in Board of
Trustees that it is "loath to second guess the government's judg-
ment,"" ' its assurances that, despite so deferential a standard of re-
view, the government's objective must still be supported by more than a
rational basis to survive constitutional scrutiny12 gives rise to the ques-
tion: how much more? If Posadas is any indication, the answer is: not
much.
In sum, the recent refinements to Central Hudson offered by the
Board of Trustees Court do nothing to limit the extent to which the
standards for review of commercial speech can be and are manipulated.
I do not suggest that it is only in the context of commercial speech that
a court's application of a given standard of review can be influenced or
manipulated by the value the judge ascribes to the speech under regu-
lation. To be sure, a court's subjective perceptions as to the relative
worth of "fully protected" speech may silently or subconsciously influ-
ence the level of scrutiny to which regulation of that speech is sub-
jected, notwithstanding that such differentiation is technically inappro-
priate. But because the value of fully protected speech officially
remains constant 129 (with the nature and extent of the government in-
Board of Pharmacy, and in so doing has manifested remarkably little deference toward the state's
judgment. Shapero v. Kentucky State Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988) (holding ban on direct mail
solicitation unconstitutional); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626 (1985)
(holding ban on newspaper solicitation and utilization of drawings in advertising unconstitutional;
upholding affirmative disclosure requirements); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (holding ban
on public mailing of announcement cards and advertising restrictions on description of practice
areas unconstitutional); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (upholding ban on
in person commercial solicitation); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (holding discipline of attor-
ney for noncommercial mail solicitation unconstitutional); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350
(1977) (holding ban on advertising unconstitutional).
One possible explanation may be that unlike regulation of commercial speech in other pro'fes-
sions and industries, which is within the bailiwick of the legislative or executive branches of gov-
ernment, the regulation of lawyers, including their commercial speech, has often been a matter
committed to the judiciary, more specifically, the state supreme courts. It may then be that the
United States Supreme Court considers itself uniquely competent to evaluate profferred explana-
tions for lawyer advertising restrictions, and may not feel the need to defer to state decision mak-
ers to the extent it would in other contexts.
126. See supra notes 90-91.
127. 109 S. Ct. 3028, 3034 (1989).
128. See id. at 3034-35.
129. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) ("There is 'an equality of status in the
field of ideas,'") (quoting A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER
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terest being the only variable), review of regulations with an eye to-
ward the relative value of the affected speech may occur only in sub
rosa fashion and is thus effectively discouraged.
Commercial speech analysis, on the other hand, explicitly justifies
the regulation of commercial speech with reference to both the dimin-
ished value of the speech, and the nature and extent of the government
interest in the regulation.13 In the continuing absence of any guidance
as to how much less valuable commercial speech is, that value becomes
a variable. The Central Hudson analysis, which is designed to assess
whether the government's interest is strong, direct and narrowly tai-
lored enough to outweigh the value of the speech, will thus change de-
pending upon the weight assigned to the second variable-the value of
the speech. Revision of the test for evaluating the government's inter-
est, as was done in Board of Trustees, thus does nothing to circum-
scribe the malleability of that test.
II. THE CONSEQUENCES OF DIMINISHED COMMERCIAL SPEECH
PROTECTION
As the first amendment protection afforded commercial speech
shrinks, the line separating fully protected noncommercial speech from
increasingly less protected commercial speech, becomes ever more im-
portant. Regulations standing no chance of survival, if strictly scruti-
nized as restrictions upon "pure" or noncommercial speech, may easily
withstand the passing glance the Posadas Court gave to commercial
speech. Thus, the category to which the speech is as-
signed-commercial or noncommercial-may often prove dispositive.
The Court's initial efforts to distinguish commercial from noncom-
mercial speech came in the wake of dicta in Valentine v. Chrestensen.
The Court held that handbills "communicating information and dis-
seminating opinion" were entitled to first amendment protection, while
those constituting "purely commercial advertising" were not. 131 In
Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations,
a newspaper want ad that was "no more than a proposal of possible
employment" was regarded as a "classic example[] of commercial
speech.'32 In Bigelow v. Virginia, on the other hand, a Virginia news-
OF THE PEOPLE 27 (1948)).
130. See supra notes 85-86.
131. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
132. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385
(1973).
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paper advertisement promoting the sale of abortion services in New
York was distinguished from the advertising at issue in Valentine and
Pittsburgh Press, on the grounds that it "did more than simply propose
a commercial transaction," because it "contained factual material of
clear 'public interest.' "13
The second wave of cases distinguishing commercial from noncom-
mercial.speech began with the Court's concurrent rejection of Valen-
tine and recognition of first amendment protection for purely commer-
cial speech in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy. The Court, in
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, addressed the propriety of a state
ban on prescription drug advertising. Through such advertising, the
Court observed, the advertiser "does not wish to report any particularly
newsworthy fact, or to make generalized observations even about com-
mercial matters. The 'idea' he wishes to communicate is simply this: 'I
will sell you the X prescription drug for the Y price.' "1'14 Quoting from
Pittsburgh Press, the Court concluded that prescription drug advertis-
ing-is "speech which does no more than propose a commercial transac-
tion" and is therefore purely commercial speech. 135
So far, so good. Bigelow, read in tandem with Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy, suggests that speech which simply proposes a
commercial transaction is commercial speech, while speech that "does
• . . more" than propose a commercial transaction, i.e., that "presents
factual material of clear public interest" or "generalized observations"
about "commercial matters," is not. The fly in the ointment is that
commercial advertising-let alone other closely related forms of com-
mercially motivated speech-informs, entertains or educates, and is
rarely limited solely to proposing commercial transactions.
The Court was therefore left with a couple of options. The first
was to live with the narrow definition it had created, and to accept that
commercial speech was so restricted in scope that it encompassed only
a limited number of situations, such as the classified advertisement in
Pittsburgh Press. Not surprisingly, the Court found this option un-
palatable. If a speaker could transform what would otherwise be com-
mercial speech through the simple expedient of adding a "public inter-
est" component to her sales pitch, and if such an adjustment would
133. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822 (1975).
134. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
761 (1976).
135. Id. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations,
413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)).
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provide the speaker with greater first amendment protection against
regulation, speakers would be foolish not to do so. As the Court subse-
quently noted, so narrow a definition of commercial speech "would
grant broad constitutional protection to any advertisement that links a
product to a current public debate. ' 13' Given that "many, if not most,
products may be tied to public concerns with the environment, energy,
economic policy, or individual health and safety," the resulting failure
to distinguish between commercial and noncommercial speech "'could
invite dilution simply through a leveling process of the force of the
[first] amendment's guarantee with respect to the latter kind of
speech.' "1137
The alternative was to take another whack at the definition of
commercial speech, which was done in Central Hudson. There, public
utility advertising touching upon issues concerning the nation's energy
supply obviously did more than simply propose a commercial transac-
tion. Nevertheless, such advertising was ruled to constitute commercial
speech because it was "expression related solely to the economic inter-
ests of speaker and audience."'31 This definition appears calculated to
address the problem confronting its predecessor: speech relating solely
to the economic interest of speaker and audience would seem to encom-
pass a far greater range of expression than speech that does no more
than propose a commercial transaction.
Unfortunately, defining commercial speech with reference to the
economic motivations of speaker and audience creates more problems
than it solves. On the one hand, it still does not go far enough. Conven-
tional commercial advertising is only occasionally calculated to appeal
solely to the economic interest of the audience. Rather, it can and does
appeal to the complete range of human motivations, of which economic
self-interest is only one. Indeed, the advertising at issue in Central
Hudson would appear to be calculated to address the consumer's con-
cern not only for her pocketbook, but for the nation's energy supply as
well. This new definition does not even reach the bulk of commercial
advertising, to say nothing of related forms of speech.
On the other hand, defining commercial speech with reference to
the economic motivations of speaker and audience goes too far. Politi-
cal speech in its purest form may nonetheless relate to the economic
136. Central Hudson Gas & -Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562 n.5
(1980).
137. Id. (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978)).
138. Id. at 561.
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interests of speaker and audience. A speech by a political candidate on
the state of the economy bears directly on self-governance, self-fulfill-
ment, and pursuit of truth; at the same time, its appeal to speaker and
audience may be purely economic. 13 9
Back to the drawing board. In the face of two failed attempts to
encapsulate the substance of commercial speech in a definition, the
next best option was to define it with reference to its form or context.
In Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., the Court considered
whether a condom manufacturer's brochure about venereal disease that
discussed condoms without reference to brand name (except that the
manufacturer was identified as the author of the brochure) constituted
commercial speech.'4 0
The Court conceded that the pamphlets "cannot be characterized
merely as proposals to engage in commercial transactions."'' And
while the Central Hudson definition was not specifically addressed, the
Court's acknowledgment of the speaker's desire "to convey truthful in-
formation relevant to important social issues such as family planning
and the prevention of venereal disease,"' 14 leaves little room for doubt
that the speech at issue related to more than the economic interest of
the audience, if not the speaker.
The Court was nonetheless satisfied that the pamphlets were com-
mercial speech. The fact that the pamphlet was concededly an adver-
tisement, said the Court, did not alone make it commercial speech; that
the pamphlet identified its author as the seller of a product discussed in
the brochure was likewise deemed insufficient by itself to render the
pamphlet commercial speech; and the manufacturer's commercial mo-
tivation, without more, again would not make the speech commercial in
character. "The combination of all these characteristics, however,"
opined the Court, "provides strong support" for the conclusion that the
speech was commercial. 43
Note that none of the considerations contributing to the Court's
conclusion pay any heed to the substance of the speaker's message. It is
the form or context of the message that is all important: if the speech is
in the form of' an ad, if a product is mentioned by name, and if the
139. Id. at 579-80 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Neither a labor leader's exhortation to strike,
nor an economist's dissertation on the money supply, should receive any lesser protection because
the subject matter concerns only the economic interest of the audience.").
140. 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
141. Id. at 66.
142. Id. at 69.
143. Id. at 67 (emphasis in original).
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speaker has a financial incentive to speak, the speech is commercial,
regardless of what is said. The net effect is that the degree of substan-
tive constitutional protection afforded speech is wholly contingent upon
considerations of form.
The Court has seen this as no reason to worry. At the same time
that the constitutional protection for commercial speech was being
weakened by Central Hudson and Posadas, corporate, noncommercial
speech was being strengthened by First National Bank v. Bellotti,14 4
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission,1 5 and Pacific
Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission.'". In the latter
group of decisions, the Court came to afford full first amendment pro-
tection to corporate noncommercial speech, on the grounds that the
first amendment protects the speech itself without regard to the iden-
tity of the speaker.147 Reducing the constitutional protection afforded
speech by calling it commercial, solely on the basis of its form or con-
text, thus presents. no particular problem, because the speaker is always
free to repackage the same message in a different form that the Court
will fully protect as noncommercial speech. As the Court has put it,
"[a] company has the full panoply of protections available to its direct
comments on public issues, so there is no reason for providing similar
protection when such statements are made in the context of commercial
transactions." 1 48
144. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
145. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980).
146. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S.'1 (1986).
147. Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 777 (the "inherent worth of the speech in-terms of its capacity for
informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, associa-
tion or individual"); Consolidated Edison Co., 447 U.S. at 533 (quoting Bellotti, 435 U.S. at
777).
148. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. at 562 n.5. This
view was reconfirmed in the recent case Board of Trustees v. Fox, 109 S. Ct. 3028 (1989). The
Board of Trustees Court began by asserting that "the test for identifying commercial speech"
established in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, is whether the speech "propose[s] a commercial
transaction." Id. at 3031. Such a test, however, represents a significant departure from Virginia
State Board of Pharmacy, which as previously noted, characterized commercial speech as "speech
which does no more than propose a commercial transaction." Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (emphasis added). Whereas the implica-
tion of the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy test was that speech that did more than propose a
commercial transaction was more than commercial speech, the implication of the Board of Trust-
ees test is that anything said in the context of proposing a commercial transaction is commercial
speech. In response to the contention that the solicitation at issue in Board of Trustees-a Tup-
perware party-was noncommercial speech because it involved an inextricably intertwined combi-
nation of selling housewares and home economics counselling, the Court observed that "[N]o law
of man or nature makes it impossible to sell housewares without teaching home economics, or to
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This, of course, is simply an invitation for corporate speakers to
play the very sort of games the Court had suggested it would not toler-
ate. Although a corporation may not transmute commercial speech into
noncommercial speech through the simple expedient of adding a "pub-
lic interest" component to the company's message, it may do so by re-
casting its message as direct comments on public issues. Accordingly, a
corporation that disseminates false, deceptive, misleading, manipulative
or otherwise unfair messages in furtherance of its economic interests,
but carefully avoids doing so in the context of proposing commercial
transactions, is at least arguably entitled to full first amendment pro-
tection for its efforts.
More fundamentally, defining commercial speech with reference to
the form or context in which the speech occurs is completely at odds
with the Court's justification for affording commercial speech reduced
constitutional protection. Commercial speech is deserving of less pro-
tection, the Court has said, because it is of less constitutional moment
than are other kinds of speech. Put another way, the content of the
message communicated by commercial speech is of less importance to
the first amendment than noncommercial speech. If, however, commer-
cial speech is distinguished from noncommercial on the basis of its con-
text, rather than the content of the message communicated, then there
is no rational basis for saying that the substance of what is communi-
cated by commercial speech is less important, because the substance of
what is communicated is largely irrelevant to whether the speech will
be deemed commercial in character.
One of the primary problems in assessing the, Court's several ran-
dom stabs at a definition of commercial speech is that it is not entirely
clear what the definition is intended to encompass. At a minimum, it
would seem that the Court is interested in capturing the average run of
teach home economics without selling housewares. Nothing in the resolution prevents the speaker
from conveying, or the audience from hearing, these noncommercial messages, and nothing in the
nature of things requires them to be combined with commercial messages." 109 S. Ct. at 3031.
In other words., to the extent a speaker wishes to avoid having her speech characterized as
commercial, and regulated accordingly, she must segregate her noncommercial message from the
proposal of a transaction. Tupperware parties would not constitute commercial speech if they were
confined to providing home economics counselling; and as long as no commercial transactions were
proposed, such counselling could presumably emphasize the benefits of using products that Tup-
perware just happened to sell. The state university's rule at issue in Board of Trustees, which
barred companies from engaging in commercial solicitation on campus, could thus be circum-
vented by changes in the form of Tupperware's approach: After an evening of warm, fuzzy trib-




commercial advertising within the scope of commercial speech. As
noted above, to the extent that this is the case, defining commercial
speech in terms of expression that "does no more than propose a com-
mercial transaction" or that "relates solely to the economic interests of
speaker and audience" is underinclusive. 49  .
The three factor "definition" in Bolger appears to have succeeded
where its predecessor definitions have failed, at least insofar as it in-
cludes speech taking the form of commercial advertising as part of the
definition; yet it gives rise .to new problems and leaves others un-
resolved. The problem created by hinging the quantum of constitutional
protection afforded speech upon the form of the speech, rather than on
'its content, was examined above. Still unresolved is the issue of what, if
any, speech other than purely commercial advertising or solicitation
will fall within the definition of commercial speech. What about negoti-
ations over employment contracts, consumer product labelling, corpo-
rate or trade association speech enhancing the image of the corporation
or industry, dissemination of commercial credit information, or day-to-
day correspondence between commercial entities in the normal course
of' business? Under the Virginia 'State Board of Pharmacy rationale,
the speech in each of these cases can do more than propose a commer-
cial transaction and may not propose a transaction at all. Under the
Central Hudson analysis, the speech in most, though not all, of these
contexts may appeal primarily, although not necessarily exclusively, to
the economic interest of speaker and audience. And under the three-
part test in Bolger, the speaker in each case has an economic incentive
to utter the speech in question, yet the speech need never take the form
of advertising per se, and at least in some cases, need not identify a
specific brand of product or service.
In short, in any number of cases, speech incident to the sale or
promotion of goods and services may fit one characterization of com-
mercial speech, not fit another, and fit part, but not all, of a third.
Given the options of wading back into the definitional mire in yet an-
other effort to fashion coherence from muck, or of bypassing the
swamp altogether, the courts have consistently chosen the latter alter-
native. Rather than expanding the definition of commercial speech to
encompass some or all of the above mentioned variations, the courts
have sought to accomplish the same objective by proliferating the cate-
gories of speech entitled to some, but not full, protection.
149. See supra notes 132-39 and accompanying text.
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Thus, for example, one circuit court has ruled that corporation
sponsored speech extolling the virtues of the corporation and encourag-
ing the purchase of its stock was not commercial speech. 150 While the
speech may have related solely to the economic interest of both speaker
and audience, and have thus satisfied the Central Hudson definition,
the court was reluctant to expand the scope of commercial speech be-
yond the context of commercial advertising, for fear that doing so
might inadvertently result in recategorization of speech traditionally re-
garded as fully protected.' Because the speech was not concededly
commercial advertising, reasoned the court, it did not satisfy the first
component of the Bolger definition and was thus not commercial
speech. 52 That did not mean, however, that the speech was fully pro-
tected. Rather, concluded the court, because the speech concerned se-
curities, which have traditionally been subject to extensive regulation,
such speech was entitled to no greater protection than commercial
speech.'
Similarly, in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc.,
the Supreme Court majority rejected the dissent's implication that
commercial credit information disseminated by one company to an-
other was commercial speech.' Such speech was entitled to less pro-
tection than the normal run of speech discussing public figures or issues
of public interest, not because it was commercial in character, but be-
cause it addressed matters of purely private concern. 155
As a final example, the Supreme Court and the lower courts con-
tinue to tiptoe around the question of whether and under what circum-
stances labor relations activities may constitute commercial speech. In
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the Court defended its decision to
grant constitutional protection to commercial speech by noting that the
speech of labor disputants has been afforded constitutional protection,
notwithstanding that it, like commercial advertising, may be "of an en-
tirely private and economic character."' 15 Seeing "no satisfactory dis-
tinction" between commercial advertising and the speech of parties to
150. Securities and Exch. Comm'n v. Wall Street Publishing Inst., 851 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1342 (1989).
151. Wall Street Publishing Inst., 851 F.2d at 372.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 372-73.
154. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 n.5, 762 n.8
(1985).
155. Id. at 758.
156. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763 n.17 (1976).
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labor disputes, the Court concluded that commercial advertising was
entitled to first amendment protection.
15 7
Notwithstanding the dicta in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy,
lower courts have questioned whether various forms of speech arising in
connection with labor activity can accurately be characterized either as
speech relating solely to the economic interests of speaker and audi-
ence, or speech proposing a commercial transaction.'58 The Supreme
Court has likewise expressed reservations as to whether union handbills
urging shoppers not to patronize a shopping mall because the owner
paid substandard wages constituted commercial speech.' 59 The speech
of labor disputants is nonetheless regulated more closely than other
forms of speech, but as a category separate unto itself.'
The potential for continued proliferation of the categories of sub-
standard speech is considerable. Product labeling may be "commercial
speech." On the other hand, it does not necessarily propose a commer-
cial transaction, does not relate exclusively to the economic interests of
the audience, and is not advertising per se. Consequently, it may be
assigned its own special niche, and like securities, may be afforded di-
minished protection on the grounds that it has traditionally been sub-
ject to extensive regulation. The whole range of communications be-
tween businesses, within businesses, and between businesses and the
public, is arguably subject to some but not full first amendment protec-
tion because it is commercial speech, because it is private speech, be-
cause it is traditionally subject to regulation, or just because.
In all of these cases, the speech at issue is a means to the end of
doing business-it is incident to the sale or promotion of goods and
services. As discussed in the first section of this Article, there are good
157. Id. at 763.
158. Hospital & Serv. Employees Union v. NLRB, 743 F.2d 1417, 1428 n.8 (9th Cir.
1984); Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. and Constr. Trades v. NLRB, 796 F.2d 1328, 1335 n.7 (11 th Cir.
1984).
159. The Court has stated:
We do not suggest that communications by labor unions are never of the commercial
speech variety and thereby entitled to a lesser degree of constitutional protection. The
handbills involved here, however, do not appear to be typical commercial speech such as
advertising the price of a product or arguing its merits, for they pressed the benefits of
unionism to the community and the dangers of inadequate wages to the economy.
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568,
576 (1988).
160. See generally Note, Peaceful Labor Picketing and the First Amendment, 82 COLUM.
L. REV. 1469 (1982) (criticizing the diminished first amendment protection afforded labor
picketing).
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reasons for permitting speech of this kind to be regulated more closely.,
There has, however, been no recognition by the courts, and little recog-
nition by commentators, that these cases present similar problems that
should be addressed in similar ways. Rather, the problem of regulating
speech in the labor context has been analyzed independently of the
problems of regulating commercial speech, speech relating to the sale
of securities, and so on.
The obvious solution might be to expand the definition of commer-
cial speech to encompass these related forms of expression. The prob-
lem with such an. approach, however, is twofold. First, attempting to
capture speech in a preestablished category is inherently problematic.
The litter of tried and abandoned characterizations of commercial
speech, strewn across a line of Supreme Court decisions, is evidence of
how difficult it is to fashion a relatively simple, narrow definition of
commercial speech, let alone a broad, all encompassing one. Second,
the task is made even more difficult by the fact that the line separating
commercial from noncommercial speech has acquired exaggerated sig-
nificance. As the chasm separating the quantum of protection afforded
commercial and noncommercial speech has become increasingly vast,
the definition of commercial speech has become increasingly critical.
.III. A MULTIFACTOR APPROACH
Any effort to categorize speech on the basis of its content must
begin with the recognition that no bright lines exist. This is not to dis-
parage all efforts to draw such lines. Ther is, for example, no getting
around the need to delineate what is and is not deserving of first
amendment protection, however problematic, specious or elusive that
line may be. Accepting that a line must be drawn, it might just as well
be drawn brightly, so to better serve the interests of clarity and
predictability.
The difficult and sometimes impossible task of parsing what is
from what is not entitled to constitutional protection is one exercise in
line drawing that may be unavoidable. There is, however, no compara-
ble need to subdivide protectable speech into a hierarchy of categories,
with "commercial" speech, "securities" speech, "labor" speech, and
others, assigned a lower intrinsic value than other categories of
expression.
Instead, I begin with the premise that it is neither possible nor
desirable to conclude that one category of protectable speech is more
valuable than another. That does not mean that some kinds of speech
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are not subject to greater regulation than others. There are a variety of
attributes to speech incident to the sale of goods and services that
render regulation of that speech less troublesome.'' Those attributes
are not limited to commercial speech as the Court has tried to define it,
but apply in varying degrees to securities, labor and corporate speech.
The common link is that such speech occupies the gray area between
the marketplace of goods and services and the marketplace of ideas.
In assessing how closely one should scrutinize a regulation of
speech, focus should be shifted away from pigeonholing speech into a
category on the basis of ultimately arbitrary factors, but rather toward
an assessment of whether the speech possesses attributes that would
render government intrusion less troublesome. One can better under-
stand how this approach would play out in practice by exploring its
application in three different contexts: the regulation of false speech;
the regulation of deceptive or misleading speech; and the regulation of
truthful, non-misleading speech.
A. The Regulation of False Speech
False speech has long been regarded as categorically devoid of first
amendment value. 162 It is fair to say that false speech bears, at best, a
marginal relationship to the exposition of ideas,' hinders rather than
facilitates political decisionmaking, and makes no meaningful contribu-
tion to the self-realization of the listener. There is an argument to be
made that the contribution of speech to the speaker's self-realization
does not depend upon whether the speech is truthful."' As an initial
matter, one may wonder whether self-realization as a first amendment
161. See supra notes 51-84 and accompany text.
162. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumers Council, 425 U.S. 748,
771 (1976); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 499 n.3 (1975); Gertz v. Robert
Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974).
163. It has been argued that false speech can be expected to elicit truthful counterspeech,
and therefore makes a contribution to pursuit of the truth. M. NIMMER, supra note 24, § 3.03[B],
at 3-16. Accepting for the moment that this assumption is correct, the question remains whether
false speech makes a net contribution to pursuit of the truth when the harm to truth seeking
created by the falsehood is taken into account. After all, a crime wave may result in a more
responsive and efficient police force, just as a stronger and more effective Federal Trade Commis-
sion may emerge from a protracted bout with a spate of particularly fraudulent advertising. In
neither case, however,'is one inclined to congratulate the criminals or advertisers involved for a job
well done, because they have done more harm than good.
Moreover, in the commercial arena, it is not as safe to assume that false speech will elicit
truthful counterspeech. As previously indicated, there are financial and temporal disincentives to
counterspeech in the commercial context. See supra notes 55-62 and accompanying text.
164. M. NIMMER, supra note 24, § 3.07[B], at 3-16.
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value characterized in terms of fulfilling the "need of many men to
express their opinions on matters vital to them if life is to be worth
living" '165 should logically reach the speech of the thankfully few for
whom a day without fraud, perjury or slander is a day without mean-
ing. Setting that to one side, however, self-expression is but one of sev-
eral justifications for the freedom of speech that the Court has ac-
knowledged in adopting an eclectic approach to the first amendment.
To the extent that speech contributes to self-realization, while exerting
a detrimental impact on other first amendment values, an eclectic ap-
proach to the first amendment properly takes those other values into
account in concluding that false speech does not make a net contribu-
tion to first amendment values.18 Accordingly, to the extent that gov-
ernment action prohibits or otherwise regulates false speech without af-
fecting truthful speech, there is no legitimate speech interest to balance
against the government interest in regulation. Therefore, the regulation
should stand if it can survive minimal due process scrutiny.
The real problem is in deciding when and to what extent govern-
ment action directed against false speech exerts an impact upon truth-
ful speech. Resolving that problem necessitates two inquiries: first, is
the government's characterization of speech as "false" trustworthy and
second, will regulation of false speech discourage speakers from utter-
ing truthful speech, out of fear of government regulation?
When the government restricts speech on the ground that it is
false, concern that the government may not be trusted to claim a mo-
nopoly on the truth is lessened to the extent that the falsity of the
speech can be objectively verified. If, for example, the assertion that
person A made statement B is demonstrably false, it may form the
basis for a Federal Trade Commission cease and desist order, a perjury
charge, a slander judgment, or any of a variety of other government
actions, depending upon the context in which the statement was made.
Regardless of whether the speech is political, scientific, artistic or com-
mercial in character, there is no argument that the government is at-
tempting to redefine the truth.
Even when the falsity of particular speech is not free from doubt,
the risk that the government's determination will be improperly biased
is still lessened to the extent such determinations are confined to ex-
165. Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 33 (1941).
166. M. NIMMER, supra note 24, § 1.03, at 1-52 ("In balancing speech and anti-speech
interests, the speech interest may often be found subordinate to the anti-speech interest where
only the self-fulfillment, and not the enlightenment function, is served by the speech.").
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press or implied representations of fact made in the context of speech
incident to the sale or promotion of goods and services. With respect to
representations of fact, it is possible to assess objectively the govern-
ment's claim that the representation is false, which would not be the
case as to representations of opinion.16 7 Moreover, there is an inherent
economic incentive for speakers to exaggerate the representations they
make to facilitate the sale of their goods and services, thereby justify-
ing greater government vigilance in evaluating those representations.
Finally, the consequence of a false representation is that the listener is
often given a reason that does not exist to buy a product or service. The
logical consequence of having the listener act upon that falsehood is
frustration of the listener's expectations and economic or physical in-
jury, both of which the government has an indisputable interest in
preventing. In other words, the government's interest in preventing eco-
nomic or physical injury justifies its efforts to act against close cases of
false speech, whereas in other contexts the government's motivations
for doing so might be suspect.
Even accepting that the government's motives are pure and that its
assessments of falsity are unbiased (so that truthful speech is not at
risk of being wrongfully labeled false), prohibition of false speech poses
a second potential threat to truthful speech: fear of government sanc-
tion for uttering false speech could discourage the dissemination of
truthful speech. 68 As previously discussed, however, the profit motive
underlying speech incident to the sale or promotion of goods and ser-
vices makes speakers less timid about approaching the line separating
truth from falsehood.16 9 Commercially motivated speech incident to the
sale or promotion of goods and services can be presumed to influence
the content of speech in a predictable direction-toward encouraging
purchase of the product. The commercial motivation renders speech
"hardier" because there is a financial incentive for the speaker not to
alter the content of the communication unless required to do so, or un-
less alterations in content can be made without diminishing prospective
profits. In such cases, the risk of adversely affecting truthful speech by
banning false speech is reduced.
167. See supra notes 63-68 and accompanying text.
168. Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340-41 (1974) ("Although the erroneous
statement of fact is not worthy of constitutional protection, it is nevertheless inevitable in free
debate . . . . And punishment of error runs the risk of inducing a cautious and restrictive exercise
of the constitutionally guaranteed freedoms of speech and press.").
169. See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
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The foregoing analysis counsels no significant changes in the regu-
lation of false commercial speech, which the Court has properly con-
cluded is deserving of no first amendment protection. It does, however,
clarify, if not change, the approach that should be taken to false speech
falling outside the comparatively narrow scope of commercial speech,
but within the larger purview of speech incident to the sale or promo-
tion of goods and services, particularly corporate speech.
The Court has observed on a number of occasions that the speech
itself, and not the identity of the speaker, is relevant to deciding
whether and how much first amendment protection to give the
speech.17 Accordingly, the Court has stated that the corporate identity
of the speaker is irrelevant to its first amendment analysis and that
corporate noncommercial speech is entitled to full first amendment pro-
tection.171 While the Court has not had an opportunity to confront the
issue directly, one implication of extending full protection to corporate
speech is that the government may be constrained to tolerate false cor-
porate speech to a greater extent than false commercial speech. 172
This should not be the case. As an initial matter, I take issue with
the conclusion that the identity of the speaker is irrelevant to the quan-
tum of protection that should be afforded the speech. The statement:
"Buy a heat pump; it will cut your heating bills in half" is fully pro-
tected noncommercial speech if spoken by Ralph Nader, and partially
protected commercial speech if spoken by Al the heat pump salesman.
If, as the Court has repeatedly emphasized, the speaker's motivations
are relevant to the identification of common sense differences justifying
170. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 533 (1980) (quoting
First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978)).
171. Consolidated Edison Co., 447 U.S. at 533.
172. New York Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc. v. Insurance Information Inst., 554
N.Y.S.2d 590 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) (first amendment prohibits application of state deceptive
business practices and false advertising statutes to noncommercial speech of insurance trade asso-
ciation). This issue was also confronted recently by the Federal Trade Commission, in an action
against an advertisement run by R.J. Reynolds. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 5 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 22,522 (April 11, 1988). The advertisement did not identify a brand of cigarettes and
did not propose or expressly encourage the consumption of cigarettes. Rather, it merely critiqued
scientific evidence linking smoking and disease. The Federal Trade Commission brought a com-
plaint against R.J. Reynolds on the grounds that the company's characterization of the scientific
evidence was false and misleading. The administrative law judge dismissed the complaint on the
grounds that the advertisement was noncommercial speech, and was therefore beyond the reach of
Federal Trade Commission action. The full Commission reversed the administrative law judge,
concluding that the speech was commercial in character, and remanded the case for a hearing on
the merits. The case ultimately settled.
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toleration of greater government interference with some kinds of speech
over others, then the identity of the speaker is obviously relevant.
Speech by for-profit corporations, be it technically "commercial"
or not, is commercially motivated. Accordingly, the same "hardiness"
that inheres in commercial speech is present in equal measure in corpo-
rate noncommercial speech. Assuming that the government is not seek-
ing to interpose itself as an ex officio truth fairy where the "truth"
cannot properly be ascertained, false corporate speech can be properly
restricted."' 3
B. The Regulation of Deceptive or Misleading Speech
A false statement is one that is literally untrue or incorrect. An
example would be the representation that "Cereal X contains twice as
much vitamin A per serving as Cereal Y," when it does not. This liter-
ally false statement is obviously capable of deceiving the listener, in the
sense of communicating an incorrect impression. 174 At the same time, a
literally true statement is equally capable of deceiving the listener. Re-
ferring back to the cereal example, suppose that cereal X contains
twice as much vitamin A per serving as cereal Y, but that the serving
size for cereal X is twice as large as for cereal Y. To the extent the
representation conveys the impression that a-person who eats a serving
of cereal X will walk away with more Vitamin A than if she eats a
173. Insofar as newspaper, magazine and television publishing operations are corporations,
one may wonder what the implications of proposing to regulate false and deceptive corporate
speech would be for the press. The answer is none. Long before the Supreme Court first acknowl-
edged in Bellotti that corporate speech generally was deserving of first amendment protection, the
Court had separately upheld the first amendment rights of press organizations-incorporated and
unincorporated alike. The press is singled out for separate mention in the first amendment, which
some commentators have argued should constitute a basis for protecting the press that is indepen-
dent of the freedom of speech. Baker, Press Rights and Government Power to Structure the Press,
34 U. MIAMI L. REV. 819 (1980); Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS LJ. 631 (1975). Irre-
spective of whether the press clause creates a constitutional basis for singling the press out for
separate protection, the fact remains that historically the press has occupied a unique niche in
American society and has received a unique degree of protection in American law. See generally
L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION (1960). Nothing I propose in this Article would change that.
Insulating the speech of the incorporated press from regulations applicable to the speech of other
corporate entities, may well give rise to the prickly question of where corporate speech ends and
the 'corporate press begins-as, for example, in the case of a magazine sponsored by a single
corporation. Regardless of how the press is ultimately defined, however, it does not follow that
constitutional authority to regulate false corporate speech generally includes authority to regulate
the incorporated press.
174. Craswell, Interpreting Deceptive Advertising, 65 B.U.L. REV. 658, 660-61 (1985) ("a
consumer is 'deceived' if and only if the consumer forms a belief about some propositioni of fact
and that belief is false").
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comparable amount of cereal Y, the representation is deceptive or mis-
leading.'75 The: discussion of deceptive or misleading representations in
this section is limited to representations that may deceive without being
literally false.
The Supreme Court has summarily concluded that deceptive
speech is on a par with false speech, and is thus deserving of no consti-
tutional protection.'76 This is true with respect to perfectly deceptive
speech-speech that conveys an accurate impression to no one. On the
other hand, what of speech that misleads some, but conveys accurate
and valuable information to others?
Preventing deception in advertising, labelling and other business
communications would be essentially pointless if the definition of de-
ception was limited to acts or practices that would mislead everybody.
In such a case, a business could escape a charge of deception by locat-
ing a lone, infinitely cautious, skeptical and neurotic consumer who
could testify that he was not misled. Not surprisingly, then, regulatory
definitions of deception have fallen short of insisting upon perfectly de-
ceptive representations. The Federal Trade Commission, for example,
has characterized a deceptive practice as one with a tendency or capac-
ity to mislead Drdinary consumers, or more recently as one that is likely
to mislead reasonable consumers. 177
The net effect is that speech is routinely banned as deceptive, not-
175. Professor Craswell makes a similar point with the following example:
Consider an ad that reads: "Enjoy the feel of real mink. Buy a Von Pelt coat today." This
ad does not literally claim that Von Pelt coats are real mink. It merely urges the reader to
do two things (enjoy real mink, and buy a Von Pelt) without explicitly asserting any rela-
tion between the two. However, consumers who saw such an ad would almost surely expect
to get real mink if they bought a Von Pelt coat. In legal terms, this would be an "implied
claim" that the coat was real mink, and the lack of explicit or literal falsity would not be a
defense.
Id. at 669. See also McNeilab Inc. v. American Home Prods. Corp., 501 F. Supp. 517, 524-25
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (quoting American Brands, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 413 F. Supp.
1352, 1356-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1976)) (distinguishing "a statement that is actually false" from a
"statement acknowledged to be literally true" that "nevertheless has a tendency to mislead, con-
fuse or deceive," in the context of a Lanham Act claim for deceptive advertising under 15 U.S.C.
§ 1125(a)).
176. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumers Council, 425 U.S. 748,
771 (1976) (in rejecting a state ban on prescription drug advertising, the Court observed that the
state did not "claim that prescription drug advertisements are forbidden because they are false or
misleading in any way. Untruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been protected for
its own sake.").
177. In re Cliffdale Associates, Inc., 103 F.T.C. 110 (1984) (the three member majority




withstanding that it may be truthful and non-deceptive for a significant
segment of the audience. Existing definitions of deception ensure that
whatever first amendment value there may be in speech that deceives
some but not others, it is inevitably offset by the government interest in
regulation. Put another way, step one of the Central Hudson test,
which places deceptive speech outside the scope of first amendment
protection, represents a categorical application of the succeeding three
steps: that the government has a substantial interest in preventing de-
ception and consumer injury resulting from deception; that the interest
is directly furthered by a ban on deceptive speech, including speech
that may deceive some but not others; and that such a ban is no
broader than necessary, given that a ban limited to perfectly deceptive
speech would not be effective in preventing most deception.
Conceptually, it may be preferable to view restrictions upon less
than perfectly deceptive speech as categorically permissible regulation
of otherwise protectable commercial speech, rather than as unprotected
noise falling wholly outside the first amendment. Unlike false speech,
which is inevitably valueless, deceptive speech is without first amend-
ment value only to the extent it misleads.
Advertising or labelling of certain foods as low in cholesterol pro-
vides a useful illustration. Recent studies have associated a low choles-
terol diet with a reduced risk of heart disease, prompting a number of
advertisers to advise consumers that their products are cholesterol
free. 178 The problem is that many of these same products are high in
saturated fat, which has been demonstrated to increase blood choles-
terol levels, e.g., snack foods deep fried in palm or cottonseed oil.
Advertising a food as low in cholesterol when it is high in satu-
rated fat may well mislead the consumer who does not focus on the
presence of saturated fat in the product, or who is unaware of the rela-
tionship between saturated fat and blood cholesterol levels. Such a con-
sumer is likely to see the statement "no cholesterol" and assume, at a
178. The Surgeon General has issued a report on diet and health that endorses the conclu-
sions of studies finding a relationship between a low-cholesterol, low-fat diet, and a reduced risk of
heart disease. Surgeon General's Report on Nutrition and Health (United States Department of
Health and Human Services 1988). Other studies referenced in the Surgeon General's report
found relationships between sodium consumption and hypertension, between calcium consumption
and osteoperosis, and between dietary fiber and colo-rectal cancer. Food manufacturers have capi-
talized upon these studies by touting those attributes of their products that are consistent with
diets that may reduce the risk of disease. The proliferation of such advertising is reflected in the
abundance of regulatory action directed against it. See, e.g., the cases cited in Harris, Legal Re-
strictions on Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Advertising, 43 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 249 (1988).
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minimum, that eating the product will not adversely affect her blood
cholesterol level, which may not be the case.
At the same time, the no cholesterol representation may provide
valuable information to the highly sophisticated consumer. Such a con-
sumer may know that the absence of cholesterol alone is insufficient to
assure that the food will make a positive contribution to a diet designed
to reduce blood cholesterol levels, and that in light of the saturated fats
listed in the ingredients and the grams of fat per serving listed in the
nutrition information, the product would likely do the consumer's blood
cholesterol level more harm than good. Nevertheless, if such a con-
sumer is on a mission to buy junk food, the information that a particu-
lar brand of chip is cholesterol free may be of value in choosing be-
tween it and a competing brand equally high in saturated fat but fried
in lard, thus containing cholesterol as well.
For the sophisticated consumer, the representation at issue is not
misleading; if the audience were confined to such consumers, there
would be no-argument that the advertisement was deceptive. In addi-
tion, there would be no basis upon which to claim that the ad was un-
deserving of first amendment protection. If the audience is expanded to
include less sophisticated consumers who may be misled, the first
amendment value of the information to those who are not misled is in
no way diminished. The most that can be said is that the government
interest in preventing deception of the less sophisticated consumers off-
sets the first amendment value of the speech to the more sophisticated
consumer.
The implication of acknowledging a first amendment interest in
less than perfectly deceptive speech is that there exists some constitu-
tional dimension to regulatory definitions of deception Suppose, for ex-
ample, that deception is defined to include any representation that mis-
leads a member of the audience. In such a case, the Federal Trade
Commission could presumably amass an elite cadre of village idiots,
one or more of whom is inevitably confused by everything, and system-
atically find all commercial speech deceptive. In such a case, the gov-
ernment interest in preventing deception of the very few may well be
outweighed by the first amendment value of the speech for the many.
In the parlance of Central Hudson, so expansive a definition would not
directly advance the government's interest in preventing deception,
given how few additional consumers are protected, and would be unrea-
sonably broad in scope.
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C. The Regulation of Truthful, Non-Misleading Speech
Now for the hard part. The government is on its weakest ground
when it seeks to regulate the content of truthful, non-misleading
speech, be it commercial or noncommercial in character. Professor
Laurence Tribe characterizes regulations aimed at the communicative
impact of speech as subject to "Track 1" analysis, in which the first
amendment interest is all but absolute, except to the extent that the
expression at issue falls into a category outside the scope of the "free-
dom of speech," such as obscenity or fighting words.1"9 "Track 2" anal-
ysis, in contrast, is reserved for cases in which the regulation is directed
toward the noncommunicative impact of expression."' In such cases,
as, for example, with time, place and manner restrictions or with the
regulation of conduct that may have an expressive component, the inci--
dental impact of the regulations upon speech must be balanced against
the government interest in regulation."' To the extent commercial
speech is regulated on the basis of content, the regulation should theo-
retically qualify for rigorous Track 1 treatment. In practice, however,
the Court has subjected commercial speech restrictions to less search-
ing scrutiny more closely akin to that given speech in Track 2. In the
recent Board of Trustees v. Fox case, for example, the Court likened
the level of scrutiny given commercial speech restrictions to that given
time, place and manner regulations, or restrictions on expressive
conduct. 82
I. Content Neutral Regulations
Time, place and manner restrictions and regulations of expressive
conduct are given diminished scrutiny because the purpose served by
such restrictions and regulations is unrelated to the suppression of the
communicative impact of speech and, therefore, is less threatening to
first amendment values."8 3 Put another way, the rationale for Track 2
scrutiny is that when government regulation exerts only an incidental,
content neutral impact on speech, the government's methods and mo-
tives are less suspect, and the degree of judicial skepticism reflected in
the standard of review is properly reduced.
179. L. TRIBE, supra note 13, at 791-92.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 792.
182. Board of Trustees v. Fox, 109 S. Ct. 3028, 3033-34 (1989).
183. See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
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In some instances, commercial speech may likewise be regulated in
furtherance of objectives unrelated to the goal of suppressing dissemi-
nation of the speaker's message. Therefore, commercial speech is justi-
fiably subject to less rigorous scrutiny on that ground. In Valentine v.
Chrestensen, for example, the legislature's objective in limiting the
manner in which commercial speech could be disseminated by prohibit-
ing commercial handbills was to prevent litter. The city's concern had
nothing to do with either the message the handbills communicated or
the public's response to such communications. 8
Similarly, in Board of Trustees v. Fox, the state university resolu-
tion at issue banned commercial enterprises from operating on cam-
pus. 185 The ban encompassed speech, but the effect on speech was ar-
guably incidental to the focus of the resolution, which was aimed at
commercial practices or conduct. Again, in Metromedia, Inc. v. City of
San Diego, a plurality of the Court concluded that a ban on commer-
cial billboards, which had been enacted not because of objections to the
substance of the commercial messages communicated, but because of
aesthetic concerns over the physical presence of billboards, was consti-
tutional as a restriction on commercial speech.188
In none of these instances were the restrictions at issue "neutral"
in the traditional sense, because the government had sought to limit the
impact of such restrictions to commercial expression while leaving non-
commercial expression untouched. This subject matter distinction
would likely be intolerable if made between different categories of
speech in the noncommercial sphere. 87 The government has, however,
traditionally played a role in the regulation of commerce. Conse-
quently, a subject matter distinction that singles out speech in com-
merce for special regulation may give rise to none of the suspicions that
would occur if speech on, say, nuclear energy, were similarly targeted.
When, as in Valentine, Board of Trustees and Metromedia, the gov-
ernment objective is unrelated to the suppression of the message com-
184. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
185. 109 S. Ct. 3028 (1989).
186. 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
187. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980) ("The first
amendment's hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular
viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discussion on an entire topic."); Police Dep't v. Mos-
ley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (the first amendment prohibits restrictions upon speech "because of its
message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content"). See also Stone, Restrictions of Speech




municated, the regulation may reasonably be regarded as content neu-
tral for purposes of constitutional analysis, notwithstanding that speech
in the commercial arena alone is subject to the regulation. Such subject
matter distinctions are premised upon the government's proper and
non-suspect involvement in the regulation of commercial practices, and
do not warrant special judicial skepticism. Put another way, otherwise
neutral regulations of time, place and manner or of expressive conduct
should not be considered less than neutral simply because their inciden-
tal impact on expression may be limited by subject matter to speech
incident to the sale or promotion of goods and services.
2. Content-Based Regulations
Diminished scrutiny of restrictions upon speech incident to the sale
or promotion of. goods and services cannot always be justified on the
ground that the restrictions do not directly regulate speech content, be-
cause such restrictions often do. In such cases, the Track 2 rationale
for a more relaxed standard of review is inapplicable. In its stead, the
Court has offered a hodgepodge of explanations for why content-based
regulations of commercial speech are deserving of only intermediate
scrutiny, as compared to that given content neutral restrictions on non-
commercial speech under Track 2: commercial speech is hardier than
other speech; it is more objectively verifiable; it concerns matters within
the special competence of the speaker; and it is of less constitutional
portent."'8
These miscellaneous explanations fall into one of two categories:
those suggesting that the government's interest in regulation is
stronger, and those suggesting that the speech interest is weaker. As
previously discussed, it is my view that only the former category is
valid."' Even within that former category, however, the most that can
be said is that the various features of speech incident to the sale or
promotion of goods and services can combine to justify content-based
regulation where such regulation would otherwise be forbidden. From
this result, it does not logically follow that all content-based regulation
of such speech is invariably deserving of diminished scrutiny. Rather,
content based regulation of speech incident to the sale or promotion of
188. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
771 n.24 (1976); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562
n.5, 564 n.6 (1980).
189. See supra notes 51-130 and accompanying text.
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goods and services is deserving of less stringent scrutiny only to the
extent that the factors making it so are present in any given case.
The government may attempt to regulate speech incident to the
sale or promotion of goods and services for reasons that are no less
troublesome than for other kinds of speech. That will be the case when-
ever the government regulates speech for fear the speech will function
normally by persuading, informing or educating the audience. Speech
can persuade, inform or educate the audience in commercial and non-
commercial contexts. To the extent the only "danger" the regulation
seeks to avert by banning speech is the risk that the public will find the
speech persuasive and put it to poor use, there is- no more reason to
tolerate suppression in the commercial arena than there is anywhere
else. As the Virginia State Board of Pharmacy Court put it, "It is
precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of suppressing infor-
mation, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available, that the
First Amendment makes for us."'1 90 When, as in Posadas, the govern-
ment objective offered for regulating speech is to deprive listeners of
access to information for fear that the public will find the information
persuasive, there is no justification for reviewing the regulation with
less exacting scrutiny than would be applicable to content-based regu-
lations outside the commercial sphere. Absent some special problem
unique to speech in the commercial sphere that creates an exception to
the principle that the dangers of suppressing speech outweigh the dan-
gers of dissemination, content-based regulation should not be tolerated
to any greater extent.
Under what circumstances, then, is diminished scrutiny justified
for content-based regulation of speech incident to the sale or promotion
of goods and services? It is justified when such speech falls within an
exception to the proposition articulated by the Court in Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy-that the harm associated with suppressing speech
outweighs the harm of the public misusing speech when it is freely
available.
The Court's proposition, however, assumes that the public is ordi-
narily capable of rationally interpreting and acting upon the informa-
tion it receives. If not, the value of the speech to the truth-seeking pro-
cess is nullified, and the risk of harm associated with misuse increases
geometrically.
That assumption, however, does not always hold true. As empha-
190. 425 U.S. at 770 (1976).
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sized in Section I of this Article, speech incidental to the sale or pro-
motion of goods and services possesses a variety of features that can
short-circuit the listener's rational decision making process: the com-
mercial motivation of the speaker creates an incentive to exaggerate
product and service benefits; the appeal of product and service benefits
to nonrational needs of listeners creates unique opportunities for lis-
tener. manipulation; and the risk that consumers will be constrained to
act upon incomplete information due to impediments to the timely air-
ing of alternative viewpoints. At the same time, the relative hardiness
of .speech incident to the sale or promotion of goods and services, cou-
pled with the limited range of first amendment interests relevant to the
speaker (as compared to the listener), makes it possible to regulate
such speech more intensively and to impose affirmative disclosure re-
quirements on speakers without chilling speech unduly or otherwise un-
dercutting first amendment values. When, as in Friedman v. Rogers or
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, the government's objective in
regulating speech occurring in the context of proposing. commercial
transactions relates to preventing the harms associated with listener
manipulation, the less rigorous scrutiny of the Central Hudson test is
appropriate.
Thus, for example, while diminished scrutiny was not justified by
the explanation offered for the advertising ban in Posadas, diminished
scrutiny might be justified by alternative explanations. Gambling may
possess certain qualities that make it an addiction or a compulsion for a
significant number of consumers. The addictive feature of the activity
may effectively short-circuit the consumer's ability to interpret the pro-
motion of that activity rationally, in much the same way as overreach-
ing and undue influence may short-circuit the consumer's ability to re-
spond rationally to in-person solicitation from lawyers.19'
191. For similar reasons, dicta in Central Hudson suggests that a regulation banning speech
that encourages energy consumption solely because the public may find the speech persuasive,
should be regarded as presumptively invalid and subjected to strict scrutiny. Again, this is not to
say that a regulation of the sort contemplated in Central Hudson should invariably receive strict
scrutiny. A ban on electricity advertising that encourages increased energy consumption may be
motivated by the concern that consumers are not in a position to make rational, informed deci-
sions on the basis of the advertising alone. Consumers are being encouraged to satisfy their short
term energy wants, but may not be aware that they will be doing so at the expense of the nation's
long-term energy needs. Given that speech proposing commercial transactions is a call to action
that will often be heeded before alternative viewpoints can be heard, greater government regula-
tion is justifiable. Whether the appropriate remedy is a ban on such advertising or merely an
affirmative disclosure requirement, is a matter properly resolved in the context of the Central
Hudson analysis.
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The absence of a law forbidding the sale of a product or service
may reflect a passive legislative judgment that the harms associated
with permitting sales to continue (presumably including the harm
caused by the product or service being addictive) are outweighed by the
benefits. Accepting as much, there is persuasive force to the view that
banning speech about a legal product or service is an inappropriate
means to discourage consumption of that product or service. For the
reasons just discussed, such speech should not be banned merely be-
cause it functions in a commercial context in the same way as it func-
tions elsewhere, by persuading listeners. On the other hand, it is an
altogether different situation if the objective is not to discourage con-
sumption of the product or service, but to prevent consumer manipula-
tion. In such a case, the passive legislative determination that a product
or service should continue to be sold is irrelevant to the decision
whether speech promoting the sale of that product or service is properly
regulated on the ground that the consumer's ability to interpret the
information received has been impaired.
It was argued earlier that false, deceptive or misleading speech
can properly be regulated whenever it is incident to the sale or promo-
tion of goods or services, without regard to whether the speech includes
a commercial proposition.'9 2 Underlying this argument is the premise
that false speech, and deceptive speech, at least to the extent it de-
ceives, have no first amendment value. The concerns that have
prompted courts to extend a privilege of sorts to utter false speech in
other contexts do not ordinarily apply to commercially motivated, ob-
jectively verifiable representations incident to the sale of goods or
services.
Truthful, non-misleading speech, in contrast, is not valueless, and
presents a separate problem. I have argued that greater regulation of
truthful speech in the commercial sphere can be justified only where
the speech, though truthful, is manipulative or unfair, i.e., where the
rational decision making ability of the audience is impaired, and where
the assumption that the listener is capable of rationally interpreting the
speaker's message does not apply. A risk of manipulation sufficient to
justify regulation is ordinarily present only in cases where a commer-
cial transaction is proposed. It is in the context of proposing commer-
cial transactions that listeners are routinely encouraged, explicitly or
implicitly, to act before there may be opportunity to receive opposing
192. See supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text.
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viewpoints. It is in that context that consumers are confronted with
speech offering listeners immediate satisfaction of nonrational needs,
which may cloud the listeners' capacity to interpret speech rationally.
Speech that does not include a commercial proposition-such as corpo-
rate "noncommercial" speech-does not present the same threat to the
listener's decision making process. Corporations, like political leaders,
may succeed in manipulating their audience, but it is only in the con-
text of speech proposing commercial transactions that the risk of ma-
nipulation should be deemed sufficiently real as a general proposition to
justify reduced judicial scrutiny.193
193. This line is concededly somewhat arbitrary. Few would dispute, for example, that the
public can be irrationally influenced by the volume or quantity of speech, including but not limited
to speech proposing commercial transactions. It is too late in the day to deny the effectiveness of
commercial and noncommercial saturation advertising, independent of the merits of the message
communicated. Nevertheless, permitting the government to regulate the quantity of truthful infor-
mation disseminated would represent a rejection of a fundamental principle underlying the first
amendment-that the government cannot be trusted and should not be permitted to regulate the
freedom of speech.
Some can therefore be anticipated to react with alarm to the Supreme Court's recent decision
in Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 110 S. Ct. 1391 (1990), where a Michigan
statute prohibiting corporations from using general corporate funds to advertise in support of a
political candidate, survived first amendment challenge. Prohibiting the use of general corporate
funds to finance political advertising was deemed "precisely targeted", id. at 1398, to serve a
compelling state interest in preventing "corporate domination of the political process" by reducing
the "corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with
the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation to the public's support for the
corporation's political ideas." Id. at 1397.
Viewed uncharitably, the Court's decision in Austin "endorses the principle that too much
speech is an evil that the democratic majority can proscribe." Id. at 1408 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
More charitably viewed, however, Austin simply authorized the state to regulate a species of de-
ceptive, noncommercial corporate advertising. Corporate political advertising is a form of testimo-
nial advertising: the advertising expressly conveys the message that the corporation endorses the
candidate; impliedly, the advertising conveys the impression that the owners of the corporation,
i.e. the shareholders, likewise endorse the candidate, while the quantity of advertising dissemi-
nated reflects the depth of their commitment to the candidate. If such advertising can be pur-
chased with funds that the stockholders have contributed only for general use and not expressly
for use in supporting political candidates, the advertising reflects neither the views of the stock-
holders nor the strength of those views. In effect, words are put in shareholders' mouths, and
audiences hearing those words are misled.. That this was in fact the concern animating the major-
ity's opinion is reflected in the pains it took to emphasize that under the Michigan law, corpora-
tions remained free to purchase political advertising with funds specially segregated for that pur-
pose. In that way, concluded the Court, "the speech generated accurately reflects contributors'
support for the corporation's political views." Id. at 1398.
Justice Stevens wrote separately to express his view that there is a "vast difference" between
"debating public issues on the one hand, and political campaigns for election to public office on
the other", id. at 1407 (Stevens, J., concurring), and that Austin should not be read to authorize
segregated fund requirements for corporate noncommercial speech generally. The Court may well
find it convenient to so confine Austin, but the difference between a political campaign and a
1990]
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In light of the foregoing analysis, a threshold inquiry should pre-
cede application of a diminished standard of review to content-based
regulations of truthful commercial speech under Central Hudson: Can
the means selected to achieve the government's objectives be reconciled
with the first amendment principle articulated in Virginia State Board
of Pharmacy that the danger of suppressing speech outweighs the dan-
ger of the public misusing speech? The answer is yes whenever the as-
sumptions underlying that principle do not hold, as will be the case
when the audience's capacity to interpret speech rationally is at risk of
being impaired, and when the dangers of misuse are-thus correspond-
ingly higher. The circumstances are limited in which the risk of audi-
ence manipulation should be deemed sufficient to justify greater gov-
ernment regulation of speech content. When those circumstances are
present, however, diminished scrutiny is justified and the remainder of
the Central Hudson analysis should proceed. In applying the Central
Hudson analysis, the goal should be to confirm that the government's
objective is to prevent harms resulting from audience manipulation or
related problems, and that the means chosen by the government to
achieve that objective are logical and do not burden access to truthful
information more than is necessary to prevent such manipulation.
Thus far in this Article, I have advocated an approach to the regu-
lation of truthful speech incident to the sale or promotion of goods and
services based upon a distinction between manipulative speech, which
the government can be trusted to regulate, and merely persuasive
speech, which. the government has no more business regulating in the
commercial sphere than anywhere else. In so doing, I have offered no
clue as to how that distinction is to be drawn, except to contrast in
general terms speech that influences the listener in a manner compara-
ble to that in the noncommercial sphere, with speech that influences
the listener through an impairment or short-circuiting of the listener's
rational thought processes.
The debate over where commercial persuasion ends and commer-
cial manipulation begins is longstanding, and has attracted a venerable
line of commentators; I am in firm control of my urge to join the fray
public debate-if a legitimate distinction can be drawn at all-will often be less than vast. If
advertising that enables "corporate domination of the political process" is the problem, it is a
problem that is not confined to ads endorsing a particular candidate. Other examples include
corporate advertising that speaks critically of elected officials, advocates positions on initiatives,
referenda or recalls, or urges citizens to write their elected representatives or otherwise communi-
cate their views to any decision making body.
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in the twilight of this Article. It is enough to say that one readily avail-
able approach would be to turn to the the Federal Trade Commission's
jurisdiction over "unfair" (as distinguished from "deceptive") acts or
practices for guidance. Consistent with current FTC policy, an act or
practice is deemed "unfair," and subject to a cease and desist order on
that ground, if the act or practice is likely to result in unjustified con-
sumer injury-a criterion comprised of three sub-parts. First, the act or
practice must create a risk of substantial consumer injury, defined to
include physical or economic harm, and to exclude emotional or psy-
chological harm. Second, the harm caused by the act or practice must
exceed any benefits derived from permitting the act or practice to con-
tinue. Third, the consumer must not reasonably be able to avoid the
injury.1 94
The FTC's unfairness standard applies to acts or practices; it is
not limited to speech. As the standard has been applied to speech, how-
ever, the range of representations that the FTC construes to be unfair
may reasonably be characterized as falling within the scope of, if not
defining, consumer manipulation. as the phrase has been used in this
Article. By excluding emotional or psychological injury from the scope
of unfairness, speech in the commercial sphere that may cause "injury"
in the same way as speech arising in the noncommercial context (offen-
sive speech is one example) does not fall within the ambit of unfairness.
By confining the definition of unfairness to acts or practices, precipitat-
ing injury that cannot reasonably be avoided by the audience, unfair
speech is effectively limited to cases in which the audience cannot fairly
be expected to interpret the speech meaningfully or rationally (the as-
sumption being that a rational audience will avoid injury if it can).
Examples of acts or practices the FTC deems unfair thus include with-
holding critical information, coercion and undue influence.195
The approach advocated in this Article is undoubtedly susceptible
to a number of valid criticisms. One, however, is worth particular men-
tion. The barrier separating commercial from noncommercial speech
may be arbitrarily set, but it is concrete. By removing that barrier in
favor of a multifactor analysis, as I have proposed, there is a risk that
the principles justifying increased regulation of speech in the commer-
cial sphere will spill over and serve as precedent supporting increased
regulation in the noncommercial sphere. Along related lines, a mul-
194. S. OPPENHEIM, G. WESTON, P. MAGGS & R. SCHECHTER, UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES
AND CONSUMER PROTECTION 540-42 (4th ed. 1983).
195. Id. at 539-45.
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tifactor analysis lacks the clarity and predictability that the commer-
cial/noncommercial distinction provides. The Supreme Court has ex-
pressed a similar concern: "the failure to distinguish between
commercial and noncommercial speech 'could invite dilution, simply by
a leveling process, of the force of the [First] Amendment's guarantee
with respect to the latter kind of speech.' "196 In other words, by elimi-
nating the lines separating commercial from noncommercial speech, I
have created a slippery slope that slides inexorably toward a diminution
of first amendment protection.
This is a criticism to be taken seriously. If the multifactor analysis
that I have proposed is applied with care, however, it is a criticism that
is unwarranted.
First, assume for the sake of argument that the slope created by
rejecting the commercial/noncommercial distinction is not without its
slippery spots. Even so, it is an improvement over the prevailing ap-
proach, which employs a sort of slippery staircase that, in its own way,
is more treacherous than a slope in that it deceptively seems to offer
firm footing. Where does commercial speech end and noncommercial
speech begin? As discussed in Section II, despite the Court's best ef-
forts to create bright line distinctions, none have emerged. Board of
Trustees tells us that the inclusion of a commercial proposition is suffi-
cient but, adds Bolger, unnecessary to render speech commercial in
character. In the absence of language explicitly proposing a commer-
cial transaction, it is unclear what will be minimally sufficient to qual-
ify speech as commercial. Somewhere between the condom company
that says prophylactics are good for America, which the Court tells us
is commercial speech, and the power company that says nuclear power
is good for America, which the Court tells us is not commercial speech,
a nonexistent distinction remains waiting to be drawn. It may have a
long wait. In the interim, an amorphous category of substandard
speech has been created that can, and in the view of some Court mem-
bers, already has inadvertently brought speech undeserving of dimin-
ished protection within its scope.
As a consequence of the Court's vain efforts to define commercial
speech with the precision needed to set it apart as a discrete category,
closely related forms of expression have been excluded from the defini-
tion that may, in some cases, properly tolerate regulation to no less an




extent. Instead, the courts have proliferated the categories of substan-
dard speech, with each category or step as difficult to, define as com-
mercial speech. The rigid and arbitrary classification of speech is re-
sponsible for increasing the risk that speech will be inadvertently
classified as substandard when it is not.
Second, my slope is not all that slippery, and does not pose a real-
istic threat to speech properly deserving of full first amendment protec-
tion. The approach I have suggested would increase protection for
truthful speech in the commercial sphere by limiting the situations in
which diminished scrutiny is justified. In those circumstances in which
regulations of speech incident to the sale or promotion of goods and
services are entitled to less exacting scrutiny than that applicable to
regulations of speech in other contexts, the factors justifying dimin-
ished scrutiny are sufficiently clear to avoid misapplication of a lesser
standard of review to speech meriting full protection. Where the
speaker's financial motivation to disseminate the speech at issue ren-
ders it less susceptible to chill, and where the objectively verifiable
character of the falsehood or deception ensures that truthful speech is
not restricted, false and deceptive speech can be regulated without spe-
cial concern for either the government's motives or the chilling effect of
the government's action. Truthful speech can be regulated subject to a
less stringent standard of review, provided that the speech is regulated
to prevent audience manipulation brought about by a confluence of fac-
tors that occurs only in situations where commercial transactions are
proposed: an economic incentive for the speaker to exaggerate product
or service attributes; inadequate opportunity for audience reflection or
access to counterspeech; or an appeal to the audience's nonrational
human needs.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Speech incident to the sale or promotion of goods and services im-
plicates a range of values underlying the first amendment. Once it is
acknowledged that such speech is deserving of first amendment protec-
tion, it is inappropriate to assess the quantum of protection it should
receive with reference to the relative value of the speech. Within the
range of ideas protected by the first amendment, courts have tradition-
ally been reluctant to characterize some ideas as more important than
others, notwithstanding the intuitional appeal of doing so. Unfortu-
nately, the Court has not been similarly restrained when it comes to
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commercial speech, which the Court has characterized as categorically
less important than noncommercial speech.
This is not to say that speech incident to the sale or promotion of
goods and services cannot be more closely regulated than other forms
of speech. Increased government intervention is justified, given a range
of factors rendering regulation of such speech more trustworthy and
less troublesome. Regulations addressing problems unrelated to the
content of commercial messages, which nonetheless exert an incidental
burden upon the dissemination of such messages, are properly subject
to the diminished standard of review currently applied to time, place
and manner restrictions, and to regulation of conduct that has expres-
sive characteristics. Regulations falling into these categories are intrin-
sically less suspect because they serve objectives having nothing to do
with circumscribing the message the speaker wishes to communicate.
Regulations with otherwise content neutral objectives, which exert only
an incidental burden on commercial expression, are not rendered more
suspect simply because the incidental burden is borne by commercial
expression alone. Given the government's longstanding, legitimate, and
non-suspect involvement in the regulation of commerce, subject matter
distinctions of this limited nature are better understood as a conse-
quence of the government's traditional role in regulating the market-
place, rather than as an invidious effort to deprive audiences of particu-
lar categories of information.
With respect to content-specific regulation, there should be no im-
pediment to regulating false or deceptive speech falling within the rela-
tively broad "category" of speech incident to the sale or promotion of
goods and services-a category "defined" with reference to those char-
acteristics that render regulation of falsity or deception less trouble-
some. Those characteristics-the commercial incentive to exaggerate
product or service benefits and the traditional role of government in
regulating the marketplace to prevent consumer injury, the relative
hardiness of commercial expression, and the objectively verifiable na-
ture of the representations challenged as false or deceptive-ensure
that the regulation of false or deceptive speech is undertaken for the
right reasons, and that it will not exert an unreasonably adverse impact
on the dissemination of truthful speech.
In contrast, the circumstances in which the content of truthful
.speech incident to the sale or promotion of goods or services may be
regulated are considerably more limited. It is only when certain as-
sumptions underlying the freedom of speech do not apply that content-
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specific regulation of truthful expression in the commercial context
should be regarded with less suspicion than content-specific regulation
of expression in any other context. Those assumptions relate to the abil-
ity of the audience to interpret speech freely and rationally. Only so far
as a regulation is directed toward speech that is manipulative, i.e. that
threatens to suspend or impair the rational decision making.capability
of the audience, is diminished scrutiny justified.
I have suggested that, the. regulation of manipulative speech is
properly subject to a more relaxed standard of review only when it
arises in the context of speech incident to the sale or promotion of
goods or services-a category that again must be defined with refer-
ence to those characteristics rendering government regulation of ma-
nipulative speech less problematic. Those characteristics are different
for regulation of manipulative speech than for false and deceptive
speech because it is audience vulnerability that makes manipulative
speech a special problem. It is thus only in the context of speech pro-
posing commercial transactions, and related situations posing a compa-
rable threat of audience susceptibility to manipulation, that a problem
sufficiently imminent to justify greater judicial toleration of govern-
ment regulation is presented. In such cases, the more relaxed standard
of review developed in Central Hudson and clarified in Board of Trust-
ees is appropriate.
1990]

